What if Sam Hinkie had been able to complete his unfinished business with the Philadelphia 76ers?
Sam Hinkie’s legacy is complicated. The connotations of his actions often speak louder than the actions themselves. But through all the narratives, stories and lore, one thing remains true about him: As general manager of the Philadelphia 76ers, he used tactics that changed the league forever.
By now, almost every NBA fan knows what The Process was. Hinkie was hired by the Sixers in the summer of 2013 and promptly made his name known. His first move as GM, trading Jrue Holiday for two first-round picks, was very telling of what was to come.
Hinkie traded every veteran player of value, from Holiday to Thaddeus Young to Spencer Hawes. The Sixers’ roster went from somewhat competitive to outright dreadful in less than a year, and it was all by design.
The plan had several goals: maximize draft position in order to acquire stars, accumulate as many assets as possible and cycle through bargain-bin players to see who would stick. It was all about accumulation, both in quality and quantity, from the ground up.
There were costs though, no doubt. “Maximize draft position” is a euphemism for losing on purpose, something the Sixers did quite a bit of during this run. They went 18-64 in 2013-14, 19-63 in 2014-15, and 10-72 in 2015-16. That last season was especially dreadful, and it brought about the end of Hinkie’s tenure.
In the midst of that 2015-16 season, they were pressured into hiring Jerry Colangelo as an advisor. Colangelo was an executive for the Phoenix Suns for decades and won four Executive of the Year awards during his time there. He was also instrumental in rebuilding the brand of Team USA, helping it become a powerhouse once again on the international stage. With his experience, he was seen as someone who could build better relationships with players and other teams.
To say that Colangelo and Hinkie disagreed is probably an understatement. Within weeks of Colangelo’s hiring, the Sixers traded two second-round picks to the New Orleans Pelicans for Ish Smith. Trading picks for a veteran was the exact opposite of Hinkie’s plan, signaling a shift in the organization’s power.
By mid-April Hinkie had left his post, leaving a 13-page manifesto behind. And with him left several other great basketball minds, such as Ben Falk, founder of Cleaning the Glass.
That summer, the 76ers staged a search for a new general manager. Their eventual choice was…Bryan Colangelo, Jerry’s son. The events that have unfolded since have been pivotal in shaping the current roster and future outlook.
But what would’ve happened if the league hadn’t gotten involved? What if Samuel Blake Hinkie were still in charge of the 76ers? From the 2016-17 season on, the next few slides will outline what the Sixers did under Colangelo and company, and juxtapose it with what Hinkie and his crew likely would have done.
Naturally this is an inexact science. But by looking at what Hinkie actually did, and where the franchise was headed after he left, it’s possible to predict a revisionist’s history.
2016-17
After having the worst record in the league, the Sixers won the lottery and were awarded the first overall pick in the 2016 NBA Draft. A different executive would likely not change this fact, so it’s fair to assume that Hinkie is still in possession of No. 1 overall.
Considering that a higher draft pick is directly correlated to a higher chance at a superstar, there’s little reason to believe Hinkie would do anything with the pick other than select Ben Simmons. He was the clear-cut No. 1 prospect at the time, and still to this day is the best player from the class.
The Sixers also owned the 24th and 26th overall selections, which Colangelo used on Timothe Luwawu-Cabarrot and Furkan Korkmaz, respectively. While many consider these picks to be misses, especially since Pascal Siakam went 27th, it’s unfair to assume Hinkie would’ve picked him. Neither European wing was a horrible pick either; Luwawu-Cabarrot is a rotational wing for the Brooklyn Nets now, Sixers fans know Korkmaz’s value quite well, and there weren’t too many hits later in that draft. It’s reasonable to assume that either these two, or players of comparable value, would’ve been drafted by Hinkie.
Free agency, though, would’ve been vastly different. Colangelo’s biggest move of the summer was inking Jerryd Bayless to a three-year, $27 million contract. Double-takes at that number are justified; even in a summer where the salary cap rose dramatically, that’s an overpay.
The Sixers also signed Gerald Henderson to a two-year deal worth up to $18 million. The second year was only guaranteed $1 million, so it wasn’t a terrible contract, but the signing of Henderson himself was questionable.
And then there was Sergio Rodriguez, a former MVP of the EuroLeague with a history in the NBA. His one-year deal amounted to $8 million, a tally he definitely didn’t live up to.
For those keeping track, that’s $26 million combined on three veterans who did little more than take minutes from youngsters. There were few reasons to bring vets like them on in the first place, especially at those prices. In all honesty, there wasn’t much incentive to tie up money in anyone.
One-year deals with upside would’ve been the play for a rebuilding team like the Sixers entering Joel Embiid’s rookie year. Swings on guys like Gerald Green, Dion Waiters, Seth Curry and the like would’ve been better investments at a fraction of the cost. It’s fair to assume he signs at least one player from that group.
Ben Simmons probably still misses the entire season though, which is a bummer. Luckily Dario Saric finally came over, a decision he likely would’ve made regardless of who was in charge. It took him a while to catch on, but working through those warts was crucial for his future with the Sixers.
As for the midseason moves, one that sticks out is the Jerami Grant trade. There was little chance of Hinkie trading a cost-controlled 22-year-old for Ersan Ilyasova, who was 29, even though a future first-round pick came with the veteran. Grant stays the whole year, splitting minutes with Saric at the 4.
Then there’s that dreaded Nerlens Noel deal. The whole situation with Embiid, Noel and Jahlil Okafor was not easy to navigate, and there’s no way to know if Hinkie could’ve gotten a better offer. But it is likely that Hinkie trades one of the two before he absolutely has to, or that he just stands pat and bets that the restricted free agent market isn’t kind to Noel. In other words, he probably gets a better package for Noel, such as an actual first-round pick rather than a heavily protected one.
No Ilyasova probably cramps spacing for Embiid, as neither Saric nor Grant was a good floor-spacer back then. But is that crucial in a season where the Sixers aren’t actively trying to win? They didn’t even know what they had in the big fella yet. Sacrificing assets to make his rookie season easier paid minimal dividends; he only played 31 games in 2016-17, and after Embiid was shut down, Ilyasova was flipped for two second-rounders.
Speaking of those 31 games, it’s unlikely Embiid plays the last two against Portland Trail Blazers and Houston Rockets. There was a bit of mismanagement with his injury for those games, as he had to exit the game in Portland and miss the next three games. Why he came back for the Houston game at all remains one of the biggest blunders of the Colangelo tenure.
If he doesn’t play against Houston, there’s a chance that his rookie season isn’t over. But since I’m not a doctor, I’m not going to assume he plays any more after Portland. In this world, Embiid finishes his rookie season roughly the same way as before: flashes of brilliance but clouded by uncertainty. This makes his contract negotiations in the fall of 2017 relatively similar to what actually happened (something I’ll discuss on the next slide).
As for the rest of the team, it’s definitely not as good as the real-life version. Ilyasova and Henderson did help the Sixers win some games here and there, so not having them naturally makes the product worse. Only a pop-off from one of those low-cost swings (Green, Waiters, Curry, etc.) would make up for the veterans. Wishful thinking.
So Philly probably approaches 60 losses with complicated optics. Sure they sucked again, but Embiid was freaking awesome, Saric looks like a real NBA player, Covington and Grant are still around, the center situation is somewhat cleaner and Simmons looks like he’ll be ready for 2017-18.
Oh, and they have a better lottery position than before. Granted, the Sacramento Kings leapt to third anyway, which allowed the Sixers to exercise swap rights, so it probably doesn’t matter. But what they do with that pick definitely changes under Hinkie.
2017-18
Yes, of course, I’m referring to the Markelle Fultz trade. Colangelo traded the No. 3 overall pick and the Kings’ unprotected 2019 first-round pick to the Boston Celtics for No. 1 overall, which they used to select Fultz. Regardless of scouting, there’s almost no way Hinkie would have traded up.
Assuming that the Celtics actually would have taken Jayson Tatum at No. 1 anyway, that leaves the Los Angeles Lakers with a choice between Fultz and Lonzo Ball. There’s no guarantee that the Lakers would have taken Fultz over Ball, so assuming it for this exercise wouldn’t be fair. Let’s just say the Lakers take Lonzo anyway. That leaves the Sixers with Markelle regardless, but with an extra asset still in their back pocket.
You might think there’s not much changing, since Philly is stuck with Fultz either way. But Hinkie’s frugality with assets goes a long way. As shown with the trades Colangelo made, asset preservation was not a priority. Every brick counts when building the foundation.
That philosophy continues with the rest of this draft. That pick that the Sixers got for Jerami Grant was sent to the Orlando Magic for the 25th overall pick, which they used on Anzejs Pasecniks. In this world, the Sixers don’t even have that pick, and Hinkie probably wouldn’t have traded into the draft.
The Sixers also don’t have a motley of second-round picks in this draft, because many of the ones they acquired were from the Noel and Ilyasova trades that didn’t happen in this world. The only second that Philly still has in 2017 is the one they used on Jonah Bolden, who actually wasn’t a terrible pick given the context.
Once again, free agency is where Hinkie takes a much different approach. Colangelo was able to attract J.J. Redick, but it came at a cost: $23 million for one year, to be exact. Hinkie was never one to make big splashes, and one of his weaknesses as general manager was in relationships with free agents, so he probably looks elsewhere.
Maybe one of those upside signings from last summer paid off, and the Sixers have a reclamation project to re-sign. Kyle Korver’s three-year, $22 million deal (or a shorter deal for similar money) might have been more enticing than Redick’s. Could a bigger offer than two years, $21 million have enticed Bojan Bogdanovic to leave the Indiana Pacers? The point is, the Sixers probably look for shooting at a discount.
The $11 million signing of Amir Johnson is also not happening under Hinkie. Sure, the Sixers have to get to the salary floor, but they don’t have to be wasteful with cap space. Leaving space to possibly acquire a veteran midseason is smart for a young team that could be contending.
But for the Sixers to have a chance at contending, they need their best player on the court. The uncertainty of that happening hampered Embiid’s power in contract negotiations, leading to his contract being loaded with incentives. In real life, thankfully, he reached several minutes thresholds over the last few years to guarantee him more money.
It’s reasonable to think Hinkie would negotiate a similar “prove-it” contract with him. It was a lot of money for a guy who had only played 30 games, but if healthy, he would be worth every penny.
Another guy who got an extension that fall was Robert Covington. One of Hinkie’s favorite players, Covington fit the 3-and-D mold too well to be passed up. Hinkie wanted him in undrafted free agency in 2013, finally got him in 2014 and now had a chance to give him his next contract.
Considering the unique figures and structure of Covington’s deal, it was probably negotiated with significant help from the analytics staff. The deal amounted to four years and roughly $52 million, with the first year being the highest cap hit. That has turned into one of the best contracts in the league, and something Hinkie would have likely done too.
Grant is also technically eligible for an extension, but his fit with the rest of the team is probably still up in the air heading into 2017-18. He and Saric will once again share time at the 4, with Grant possibly getting some time at the 5.
A center that likely won’t be coming back is Okafor, who is basically a sunk cost after two seasons with the Sixers. Hinkie will have to bite the bullet on whatever he can fetch for the big man from Duke, even if that means cutting him. His presence on the roster is of no benefit to the Sixers by this point, which is evident by Colangelo trading him, Nik Stauskas and a second-rounder for … Trevor Booker.
Okafor and Stauskas get shipped off in a way that doesn’t cost the Sixers assets. Booker does not become a Sixer, and the backup 5 spot is Richaun Holmes’ to lose. Maybe another 5 comes to Philly, such as Aron Baynes, Amir Johnson (for less than $11 million) or another bargain-bin big.
The frontcourt is mostly set (Covington, Saric, Embiid), so now let’s address the backcourt. Between Korver, Bogdanovic and one of the bargain-bin wings, who should run the 2 with Simmons? Bogdanovic wins the battle, and suddenly the Sixers have the biggest starting five in the league.
The beginning of the season goes roughly the same as what actually happened in 2017-18. Simmons has some growing pains early, and the cheaper shooters aren’t as good as Redick. But the bench is stronger with Korver, Grant and a 5, meaning that the non-Embiid minutes aren’t as atrocious.
The Sixers start off treading water, and then the Simmons-shooters-Embiid model takes off. Simmons wins Rookie of the Year, and Embiid dominates with shooters around him. This version of the 2017-18 76ers is slightly worse than the real one, mainly because Bogdanovic and Korver aren’t as clean of fits as Redick. The buyout additions, Marco Belinelli and Ersan Ilyasova, also probably don’t join the fun, because their spots in the rotation are taken.
With similar regular-season performance comes a familiar postseason path as well. The Celtics roadblock is still there in round 2 unless Philly drops to the 4- or 5-seed. Simmons and Embiid probably struggle against a more experienced playoff team, Boston or whoever, and go into next season raring to make a splash.
2018-19
If you’ve been bored by how small the changes have been from Colangelo to Hypothetical Hinkie, fasten your seatbelt. The 2018-19 season brought about dramatic change from start to finish.
Just like the real-life iteration, these Sixers are on the other end of a disappointing playoff loss. There’s a narrative building that Simmons and Embiid can’t coexist if the team wants to win a championship.
Colangelo won’t get a chance to see it through though, because he’s caught up in a Twitter scandal. He and the team agree to part ways in early June, a few weeks before the 2018 NBA Draft. Since that’s not happening in this world, the Sixers might be better positioned to tackle the draft class.
That’s not to say the real-life team did poorly. In fact, they did quite well in 2018, getting an extra first for Mikal Bridges, hitting on Landry Shamet and hitting on Shake Milton.
There were extra picks that the Sixers didn’t use in real life, but instead of trading them for cash, Hinkie probably gets more draft capital for them.
Holmes and Luwawu-Cabarrot are not Brett Brown’s best friends by this time, which was why he traded them for pennies in the gap time between Colangelo and Elton Brand’s tenure. But he doesn’t have that power this time around; Hinkie does. They stay on the roster, as Hinkie believes they have value to the team. Ditto for Korkmaz, who was mostly in the G League in 2017-18.
Trading down for Zhaire Smith and a future first is a very Hinkie-esque move, and Shamet was a steal at 26. Both are reasonable mainstays in this version. The Milton trade probably isn’t though, because Hinkie seldom felt a need to trade up for anyone. For argument’s sake, let’s say they keep Ray Spalding and Kostas Antetokoumnpo (the 56th and 60th selections) rather than trading up.
Heading into free agency, the Sixers have oodles of cap space to throw at either LeBron James or Paul George. Their chances of signing one are slim to none though, just like in real life. Keeping cap space for the summer of 2019 should be a priority if they cannot land a star, because that will be their last season of significant cap space before Simmons’ extension kicks in.
So basically, this summer has to be all or nothing. And we know the “all” doesn’t happen, so one-year deals on role players is once again the move. Fultz developing a jumper would be extra cool, but we know that doesn’t happen either. The Sixers give him a chance at a backup role, but have to be prepared to look elsewhere.
The wing rotation is pretty thin unless Korkmaz or Luwawu pops. Signing a bargain-bin backup wing, or retaining one that was signed a few seasons ago, is a smart play here. The backup center spot is also in flux, but it must be addressed due to Embiid’s injury concerns. Someone like Danuel House or Glenn Robinson III might make sense to fill the former, and Ed Davis would be fine for the latter hole.
Jerami Grant is also a free agent, and the Sixers happily sign him back, probably to a similar deal as what he actually got from OKC. Though he’s technically the backup 4 on the depth chart, his defensive versatility and willingness to shoot is very helpful at the highest levels of playoff basketball. Simmons, Covington, Grant and Embiid are one of the staunchest defensive units in the league.
The starting five of Simmons, Bogdanovic (unrestricted free agent in 2019), Covington, Saric (unrestricted free agent in 2020) and Embiid was very good in hypothetical 2017-18, and is still good in fake 2018-19. The bench unit of T.J. McConnell, Fultz, Shamet, Korkmaz/Luwawu/Robinson, Grant and Davis is much better than what the actual 2018-19 Sixers’ bench had. But the team has a Fultz-sized hole: a three-level perimeter scorer/playmaker hybrid.
Also, Embiid doesn’t lead all centers in minutes for the first month of the season. Hinkie stays diligent with a plan for his franchise player, and Embiid’s rests are more structured than sporadic.
The Fultz experiment still goes on in the early part of the season, but his role fades away quickly. The Sixers get off to a slow start, unable to close games at times. Philly doesn’t seem to be much better than last year, and the urgency for a third star increases.
But instead of making a big splash for someone like Jimmy Butler, Hinkie opts for a two-way guard of lesser popularity in George Hill. Hill doesn’t fill the hole of a crunch-time scorer, but his excellent shooting, above-average defense and ability to run a simple pick-and-roll is a breath of fresh air for the Sixers.
The contract is terrible, but like what the Milwaukee Bucks did after they traded for him in real life, the Sixers have the potential to re-negotiate his 2019-20 cap hit and maintain cap space.
Hill fits like a glove as the backup 1, moonlighting as a starter when necessary. The rotation is actually somewhat deep with a 3-and-D point guard, and the Sixers go on a late-season run to snag the 3-seed.
Though the Sixers are a well-oiled machine, it’s hard to know how they’d fare against Kawhi Leonard and the Toronto Raptors. The series is probably still close, but not having Butler or Tobias Harris definitely hurts their chances. They make it a series, but the Raptors’ machine is ultimately too much for them.
Embiid, Simmons and shooters is still very effective, but might not be enough to win a Finals. Their supporting cast going into next season is Covington (locked up through 2022), Grant (locked up through 2021), Hill (restructured through 2022), Saric (restricted free agent in 2020), Shamet (locked up through 2022), Fultz (team option for 2020-21), Korkmaz, Holmes and whatever they have in Zhaire Smith (locked up through 2022).
Bogdanovic and Korver are free agents. The Sixers can approach max cap space, but their window to acquire a third star is getting tighter.
2019-20
Though the summer of 2019 happened most recently, it’s also the most difficult offseason to predict. So many stars switched teams, and many of them did so in tandems.
The actual Sixers front office did some tampering to acquire Al Horford, and had a serious advantage in retaining Tobias Harris. But Harris was mostly traded for as insurance against Butler leaving, and Horford was acquired as insurance against Embiid getting hurt.
Fultz might seem like dead money, especially in an offseason where the Sixers need to spend, but he still has value across the league. The Magic traded a protected first-round pick and a high second-round pick for him in real life. If the Sixers really wanted someone, and that someone wanted to come to Philly, they could use Fultz in a sign-and-trade.
In fact, two star guards were signed-and-traded to contenders last summer. Jimmy Butler went from Philly to the Miami Heat, and Kemba Walker went from the Charlotte Hornets to Boston. It’s no guarantee that either player would choose Philadelphia over those two spots, but the Sixers would at least have a chance, and in both cases could give more assets than Miami and Charlotte did.
That’s where this timeline truly differs from the real one. The Sixers still have a treasure trove of assets going into the 2019 NBA Draft and free agency. The Kings’ 2019 first and the entire Tobias Harris trade package (Shamet, Sixers’ own 2020 first, Miami’s unprotected first in 2021) are still in Philadelphia, as are Covington, Saric and Grant. They don’t have a third star yet, but they have several means to acquire one.
So the Sixers go into the draft with the Kings pick (late lottery), their own first (mid-20s), and three second-round picks. They need a backup center (unless Brett Brown comes to fully trust Holmes), and then possibly another guard.
The Kings pick could be used on a guard/wing hybrid like Nickeil Alexander-Walker, or a backup big like PJ Washington (if he falls) or Brandon Clarke. There were options, leaving the late first as a bit of a luxury to potentially fill the other hole. The second-round picks are even harder to gauge, and there could be a diamond in the rough among their three picks, but he likely spends 2019-20 in the G League.
So the Sixers go into free agency with Simmons, Embiid and Covington as guaranteed starters. Hill or Shamet could start at the 2 if they can’t pry a big fish, while Saric and Grant once again fight for minutes at the 4. The rookie guard (Alexander-Walker, Ty Jerome, Romeo Langford, etc.), Fultz, Korkmaz, Holmes and the rookie big (Washington, Clarke, etc) round out the bench.
It’s tough to determine what free agents would have done in this different timeline. By all accounts, Walker really wanted to stay in Charlotte, but they clearly didn’t want to pay him. Maybe the Hornets like a package of Fultz and picks better than inking Terry Rozier to a huge deal.
Even if the Sixers strike out on the summer of 2019, they still have tons of flexibility moving forward. And that’s really the point of this exercise: Instead of the franchise being drained of assets in a “death by a thousand cuts” way, they still have tons of flexibility. That remains true when Simmons’ extension kicks in starting next season, a contract that Hinkie also undoubtedly negotiates.
Hinkie’s prudence with assets went a long way. Even though his successors were somewhat careless with picks, they still had a ton to spare — enough to trade for Butler, overpay for Harris and still have enough cap space to sign Al Horford (spoiler: He’s not in this timeline).
In terms of performance, this timeline isn’t much different from the real one so far, but it certainly has a brighter future. And if the past is the same either way, I’m sure most Sixers fans would prefer the latter.