NBA Season Preview 2017-18: How the Spurs dominate corner 3s

Gregg Popovich’s system has long been referred to as “The Beautiful Game.” A moniker often used to describe soccer clubs, it’s turned the Spurs into a team that relies on quick decisions, ball movement, cutting, screening and general basketball IQ to manipulate the defense to their will.

Popovich’s system has evolved since he first became coach of the Spurs, but his principles have largely remained the same. As teams across the NBA have strived to shoot as many 3-pointers as possible, for example, the Spurs have been steady in their approach. Their 3-point attempt rate has never been above 28.0 percent in the last five seasons. For comparison, only the Knicks (27.9 percent), Pacers (27.2 percent), Pistons (26.3 percent), Bulls (25.6 percent), Suns (25.5 percent) and Timberwolves (24.9 percent) shot below that number last season. The 2016-17 Rockets more than doubled it with a 3-point attempt rate of 46.2 percent.

Despite taking a lot less 3-pointers than the rest of the league, their conversion rate was one of the highest in the NBA between 2012 and 17. During those five years the Spurs finished first in 3-point percentage twice. They shot 39.7 percent in 2013-14 and their 39.1 percent last season was tops in the league. They have finished outside of the top five just once — they ranked sixth in 2014-15.

The main reason for discrepancy between the low number of attempts and the high volume of makes is the Spurs specifically hunt for one type of 3-pointer: the corner 3. The corner 3 is the shortest 3-pointer at 22-feet away from the hoop, over a foot closer than shooting from the top of the key.

Obviously the closer to the basket a player shoots from the more likely it is that their shot goes in. With that in mind, the Spurs have derived an action to allow players to get open looks from the corner called “Hammer.” There are many variations and sequences that lead to “Hammer,” but here is a look at four of them.

Basic “Hammer”

This is the most basic form of “Hammer.” Tony Parker brings the ball down the floor and swings it to Manu Ginobili on the wing. Ginobili waits for the weakside big, Matt Bonner, to curl across the court and get in place to set an on-ball screen. At the same time, Tim Duncan replaces Bonner on the weakside block. Once the defense adjusts thinking a pick-and-roll is about to start, the wing makes a beeline toward the baseline.

The entire defense has rotated into the proper help position to slow down the pick-and-roll. Once the wing gets to the baseline, he’s likely to be met by the opposing team’s big man — Marc Gasol in this situation — and the defender on the perimeter then has to slide down to help the helper.

Here’s where the twist comes in. Instead of looking for the big in the paint, Ginobili whips a pass across the court into the corner. As the shooter cuts to the corner to receive the pass, Duncan sets a flare screen on the defender crashing down to help and it results in an open look.

This crack-back screen is where this sequence gets its “Hammer” moniker from.

Post “Hammer”

The final action here is the same, but instead of having a wing attack baseline to make the whip pass, the ball is entered into the post. The other four defenders’ eyes go to the post awaiting Boris Diaw to make a move so they can figure out how to properly rotate or send a double team if necessary.

However, Diaw makes a quick spin towards the baseline before any help or double can come. As he spins out of the post, the big on the opposite side of the floor and the weakside wing run “Hammer” and get another open 3-pointer.

Iverson Cut “Hammer”

Ginobili is one of the best wing passers in NBA history and he has mastered the whip pass required to make “Hammer” work. Popovich and the Spurs have added a twist to get the ball to him on the move and allow him to attack baseline quicker than he does in the basic “Hammer” set.

Ginobili starts the play running what is known as an “Iverson Cut.” A move popularized during Allen Iverson’s heyday with the 76ers, it’s when the opposite wing cuts across the floor off back-to-back screens set around the free throw line. As mentioned above, it was done with the intention of giving the cutter a live dribble. San Antonio uses it instead to make the defense move early and allows for the “Hammer” action on the weakside to be more of a secondary off-ball action than it is in the first two examples.

Give-and-Go “Hammer”

The final example again involves getting the ball to the wing on the move. Specifically for the Spurs, Ginobili is often the primary ball handler in the second unit. This play starts off with him bringing the ball down and quickly passing it forward to the wing. After making the pass, Ginobili follows the ball and receives the pass back to initiate a give-and-go.

Like the Iverson Cut, this action forces the defense to do something. As they try to stop Ginobili from getting a free path to the basket, the “Hammer” is being executed on the weakside. In the first clip, Alec Burks of the Jazz does a good job of fighting over the screen and running Danny Green off the line, but the floor is so spaced and the defense has over-rotated to the point that Green can finish in the lane.

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In the two examples against the Wizards, Diaw bluffs a down screen for Green before he runs off the “Hammer” screen instead. Against the Warriors we see Kawhi Leonard make a speed cut down the lane as Ginobili drives. If the defense sells out to stop the “Hammer,” Leonard would likely be open at the hoop.