Don’t kill the Titans over going for two, kill them for how they did it

NASHVILLE, TN - OCTOBER 14: Head coach Mike Vrabel of the Tennessee Titans looks on during the game against the Baltimore Ravens at Nissan Stadium on October 14, 2018 in Nashville, Tennessee. The Ravens won 21-0. (Photo by Joe Robbins/Getty Images)
NASHVILLE, TN - OCTOBER 14: Head coach Mike Vrabel of the Tennessee Titans looks on during the game against the Baltimore Ravens at Nissan Stadium on October 14, 2018 in Nashville, Tennessee. The Ravens won 21-0. (Photo by Joe Robbins/Getty Images) /
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The Titans going for two at the end of the game was the right call, but how they tried to convert was all wrong.

It’s the call heard across the pond: Rather than take an extra-point to tie the game against Los Angeles, the Titans attempted a two-point conversion to take a lead with under a minute left. They got two shots at it and failed both times.

Naturally, the popular thing to do was kill Mike Vrabel for having the gall to go for two and risk losing a game that at the very least could be tied. There’s very good reason to be annoyed by the Titans decision, but it has nothing to do with the fact that they went for two it’s how they tried to convert.

Tennessee hadn’t attempted a two-point conversion before Sunday afternoon, but the Titans had converted 80 percent of fourth-down attempts heading into Week 7 (the closest sudden death statistic to going for two). As reductive as this sounds, Vrabel decided to be unconventional in an effort to take a lead rather than give Philip Rivers and the better team a chance with time left on the clock.

The problem with going for two lies in how the Titans went about doing it. Rather than run the ball fro the goal line with a power back like Derrick Henry, Tennessee elected to throw the ball with a quarterback who is very low percentage in short yardage chances.

The two-point conversion happened between the LOS and 10-yard marker on that chart, which already isn’t good. Making things worse, the play call was a throw to Mariota’s left where he is below league average (even though that’s where the game-tying touchdown pass had been thrown).

Tennessee got two shots at trying to convert, and on the final attempt, there was a gap to Mariota’s right that could have been exploited on a sneak. Pulling the blockers and splitting that gap works, in theory, thanks to the empty backfield which would cause the secondary to pull back into coverage.

If Mariota is as developed as he was expected to be over the first four years of his career, this is a deadly RPO situation in which he holds all of the cards.

But because he’s at or below league average in most of his statistics, and he’s shown none of the capable decision-making teams expect out of their franchise quarterback, the play ends with a failed conversion. Rather than run the ball, either with Mariota or calling an actual run play with Henry on the field, the play call was a pass to the lowest percentage part of the field for Mariota in short yard situations.

That’s why the Titans lost. Not because Vrabel decided to go for two, but because the execution and play calling was wrong from the start.

It’s almost a small blessing the Titans failed the way they did, otherwise, we’re not having this very important conversation about how bad Mariota is. Vrabel electing to go for two is a gutsy move that we’re all praising if it had worked, but it’s not hard to read into him doing it because there’s no trust in Mariota pulling off an overtime win.