Coaching Didn’t Lose Game 3 For The Pellies

Apr 23, 2015; New Orleans, LA, USA; Golden State Warriors guard Shaun Livingston (34) fouls New Orleans Pelicans guard Quincy Pondexter (20) during the fourth quarter in game three of the first round of the NBA Playoffs at the Smoothie King Center. The Warriors defeated the Pelicans 123-119 in overtime. Mandatory Credit: Derick E. Hingle-USA TODAY Sports

By now, the Pelicans’ 4th quarter collapse[1. Alternatively, the Warriors’ inspiring 4th quarter comeback.] has been hashed and rehashed ad nauseum. Much of the discussion has centered on New Orleans coach Monty Williams. Why didn’t he foul at the end of the game? Why didn’t he make adjustments to Golden State’s repeated assault on the offensive boards? Basically, how did he blow it so badly?

While there has been plenty of grounds for questioning Williams over his tenure, such as how does a team with a starting front court of Anthony Davis and Omer Asik still struggle so much on defense[2. The Pellies finished 22nd in DRTG.], and especially how do they remain so porous at the rim[3. New Orleans allowed the most opponents’ shots from five feet or less of any team during the regular season.]? This, and others[2. Common complaints include clock management in end of game situations and a tendency to “foul out his own players” especially Davis by being overly cautious in situations where they are close to foul trouble.] are fair questions to ponder.

That said, blaming Williams for Game 3 is largely unfair. Sure you’d hope for better execution of the game plan on Golden State’s final offensive possession of regulation. But according to both Williams and Davis, the plan was to foul and not let the Warriors get a look from three. There’s even video of Williams appearing to tell a referee “we’re going to foul” or something along those lines. But then Steph Curry beat Quincy Pondexter so badly on his cut to the ball that he was able to catch the ball facing the basket, making it a patently bad idea to foul and give up 3 free throws instead of two:

Sure you’d hope for quicker fouls in overtime when the shot clock was off and the Warriors had the ball. However, is it too much to ask to expect an NBA-level player to simply know that’s a fouling situation? As Pellies blogger Mason Ginsberg put it on Twitter, it’s like knowing to steal second base with two outs and a full count; it’s something you just do. Further, as ESPN’s Amin Elhassan noted on Friday’s Lowe Post Podcast, the instruction to foul, if given, was likely passed along in the huddle before the play, perhaps explaining any delay in Williams visibly calling for a foul.

Really though, these end of game situations were the icing, not the cake itself. New Orleans gave the game away on their defensive backboard, and it’s hard to see how this is coaching. In the fourth quarter the Pellies had 14 opportunities at defensive rebounds all from missed field goal attempts[5. As discussed here, rebound rates on missed free throws very much favor the defense relative to missed FGA.]. They secured four. Considering that for the 2014/15 season, 76% of missed field goals were rebounded by the defense, 28.6% ain’t good. It’s instructive to look at just how. Golden State was able to get so many second and third opportunities.

For one thing, they attacked the glass ridiculously hard. Over the course of the season about 44% of rebounds were “contested[6. Defined via SportVU as an offensive player either grabbing the board or being within 3.5 feet of where it was recovered.]. Eliminating free throws, this number jumps to 51.4%. Well in the fourth quarter, Golden State contested 78.6% of their own misses. Whether the offense or defense winds up with a contested rebound is essentially a 50/50 proposition[7. On the season, the defense had a 50.5% – 49.5% edge in winning battles for contested rebounds.], which indicates there aren’t a lot of options available for a coach whose opponent commits to aggression on the offensive backboard.

You can make sure you don’t give up any more “free” rebounds than necessary by ensuring that the extra offensive players purusing rebounds still have to fight for every one. On the season around 8.7% of all missed field goals were rebounded uncontested by the offense – sometimes the ball just bounces that way. On those 14 misses, two were rebounded uncontested by Golden State. This is a little above average, but it’s a bit harsh to suggest that coaching was to blame for the Warriors being 3/4 of a board over expectation.

The other main option is to punish the opposition in transition. Unsurprisingly, the more offensive players go to the boards, the easier it can be to score on them in transition. Of course, you have to grab the rebound first. I mentioned earlier that contested rebounds are statistically speaking the proverbial “50/50 balls” that are the subject of many a cliche. Well, in the 4th quarter, Golden State won 8 of 9 of those chances. This was not a case where an undersized team got bullied for every ball – Golden State was playing Draymond Green at center. Noted muscleheads Steph Curry and Shaun Livingston won these battles. To resort to cliches myself, sometimes players just have to make plays. Golden State did and New Orleans from one through five, didn’t. Exactly why this happened isn’t clear, but it’s most likely some combination of lucky (or unlucky) bounces and physical aggressiveness on the part of the Warriors.

Perhaps there is some coaching element involved here though? Certainly, a moose like Omer Asik would grab a rebound or three? Two questions in response, first who is he going to guard in that Warriors’ bomb squad lineup? Second, and this is more of a statement than a question, but New Orleans cannot score with Asik on the court. According to NBAWOWY.com, the Pellies are only scoring 89.6 points per 100 with Asik on the court as compared to 114.2 with him off. New Orleans had built the lead by downsizing their lineup. What about Ryan Anderson, then? If Asik is going to struggle to guard, imagine how Anderson might get exploited. Still it’s possible that one of these options might have worked better, but it’s not nearly as simple as “well duh, play the better rebounder.” Because New Orleans has to get stops before rebounds even matter, and then they still have to score on the other end to close the game out.

I’ll readily concede that there is a coaching aspect to the failures of execution and mental fortitude. But if the Pelicans’ players need Williams to instruct them to not simply get beat for sheer aggression, they probably have bigger problems than even the best coaching can solve. Most importantly, blaming Williams denies credit where it’s most due: to the Warriors players for stealing a game they had no business winning with sheer muscle and determination this supposedly “soft, jump-shooting team” wasn’t meant to have.