The Los Angeles Clippers without Chris Paul are a complete mystery

Over the last several seasons, there was probably no more predictable team in the league than the Clippers. That’s not necessarily a bad thing. Continuity is a virtue in the NBA, and the Clippers had more of it than just about anyone.

Sure, they had a rotating cast of supporting characters, but they had a foundation of Chris Paul, Blake Griffin and DeAndre Jordan for six seasons, the last four of which also included J.J. Redick. That four-man group played more minutes together from 2013 through 2017 than any other foursome in the NBA, and it wasn’t particularly close. The Clippers were also electric offensively and damn near elite defensively when that unit played together, each and every season.

When they took the floor, we knew exactly how they were going to play, and for the most part, exactly how well they would play, too.

Read More: What can Milos Teodosic bring to the Clippers?

We knew Paul would run the show with his usual demanding precision. We knew Jordan would set killer screens and rampage his way to the rim. We knew Redick would fly off pin-downs all over the floor and get involved in secondary action. We knew Griffin would post-up, throw lobs in the half-court and on the break, stretch out for the occasional deep jumper and do all the playmaking Paul didn’t soak up himself. And we know that despite a spacing crunch created by having two paint-bound players in the frontcourt (and occasionally a third, depending on who manned the small forward spot), they would light up the scoreboard anyway because the talent was overwhelming.

We knew Paul would pressure the hell out of opposing guards, choking off opposing offenses at the point of attack. We knew Redick would always be in position, even if he’d struggle to hang with certain guys physically. We knew Griffin and Jordan would have occasional communication issues, but that Jordan would always be barking instructions to everyone, everywhere. And we knew that despite having two minus defenders on the floor (and occasionally a third, depending on who manned the small forward spot), they would manage to hold opposing offenses to scoring outputs below the general expectation.

We also knew that whenever one or more of those players left the floor, the Clippers were going to struggle because they just didn’t have the depth to account for the momentary loss of talent. That’s what happens when you have three max players and a highly-compensated fourth starter and embark on a series of maneuvers that subject your team to the hard-cap on a near yearly basis.

Predictably, the Clippers experienced a whole lot of success during the regular season in the Paul-Griffin-Jordan-(Redick) era. They won an average of 53.8 games a year during the six seasons the star trio played together if you extrapolate their win total during lockout-shortened 2011-12 campaign over 82 games, and an average of 54.3 during the four seasons those three played with Redick. Of course, they never quite got over the hump in the postseason, mostly due to a series of injuries but also due to inexplicable collapses that seemingly happened so often they also became predictable.

We knew the Clippers would win 55 games or so in the regular season. We knew they’d have a hard-fought first-round series that they’d maybe win or maybe lose, but they definitely wouldn’t go further. We knew there would be reports of internal strife that the Clippers swore weren’t true, and that there would be subsequent reports confirming on background that the original reports had merit. Year in and year out, we knew what to expect from them on every level because we knew exactly what they’d be.

But we don’t really know anything about what they are or what they’ll be heading into the 2017-18 campaign, the first time that’s true since the lockout. Paul is gone and Redick is gone, and so the only thing we really know is things are going to be wildly different in almost every way, both on and off the floor.

If there were ever a point guard that could be considered the polar offensive opposite of Paul, it might be Patrick Beverley, the primary piece the Clippers acquired when trading Paul to the Rockets. Both are elite defenders, but Paul controls every single inch of the floor in a way no floor general of his generation ever has; Beverley plays more of a caretaker role offensively, bringing the ball up the floor and getting the team into the offense before working mostly as a secondary creator and spot-up shooter. Making the switch from one to the other will have as dramatic an effect on the Clippers’ offense as any other personnel change this offseason.

It’s especially worth wondering what the Paul-to-Beverley transition will mean for Jordan, who became a lethal vertical spacing force due to his pick-and-roll chemistry with Paul. Beverley is not nearly the scoring threat Paul is coming around screens, and is also not in the same league as a passer. Prospective backup Milos Teodosic is a genius-level passer himself, but he’s also likely to be one of the biggest defensive liabilities in the league in his first NBA season after finally making the jump across the pond from Spain. Finding him enough minutes to juice the offense while making sure he has cover at all times defensively will be a tricky balance, especially if he comes off the bench.

Finding that dose of creativity Paul brought to the offense will be equally tricky when Teodosic is off the floor. The simple solution is to shift the majority of the playmaking burden onto Griffin’s shoulders, but passing out of the post and passing out of pick-and-roll penetration bend the defense in different ways. There will be an adjustment for everyone no matter what, even if Griffin ably absorbs that responsibility.

Danilo Gallinari and Lou Williams bring plenty of off-the-bounce verve of their own, but both players primarily create for themselves when they venture from the perimeter into the paint with their dribble. There were 103 players who averaged at least 3.0 drives per game last season, per SportVU data on NBA.com; Gallinari ranked 84th in pass percentage on drives, while Williams was just ahead of him at 83rd. Griffin, for what it’s worth, ranked 89th, while presumptive starting shooting guard Austin Rivers ranked 94th. That’s a whole lot of drivers who don’t like to pass.

The backcourt in general seems like it will take a bunch of trial and error to work out. There don’t seem to be a lot of natural pairings among the four-man group of Beverley, Rivers, Williams and Teodosic. There are some differing skill sets among the group but none that jumps out as being especially complementary, especially when you consider that Beverley, Williams and Rivers are all 6-foot-4 or shorter.

And while the Griffin-Jordan combination should keep the frontcourt humming along, there are also apparent fit issues elsewhere in the lineup. Acquiring Gallinari cost the Clippers a first-round pick and it’s obvious they hope he solves their years-long small forward problem, but he seems more like a playmaking four at this point of his career. He’s going to start and play a lot of minutes alongside the Griffin-Jordan duo, which could make for some awkwardness defensively and a bit of cramping on offense.

Beyond that minor issue, it’s difficult to discern which backup frontcourt options are best. The Clippers finally have considerable depth behind their two stars, but are you confident proclaiming any of Willie Reed, Montrezl Harrell, Brice Johnson, Sam Dekker or Wesley Johnson more deserving of rotation minutes than any other player in that crew? Again, this is a group that seems like it’ll take a bunch of trial and error to sort out.

Doc Rivers’ trial and error periods usually don’t last all that long, and they usually end with him banishing players that cost the team a considerable sum on the free-agent or trade market to the end of the bench. We’ve seen this happen with Jared Dudley, Lance Stephenson, Spencer Hawes, Jordan Farmar and more. It’ll probably happen with some of these guys this year as well.

Rivers had his PoBo powers taken away this offseason, and it’s worth asking what the future holds for him as LA’s coach, too. There seems to be a whole lot of downside risk with this roster, given the less than ideal fit of several pieces and the precipitous injury concerns associated with Griffin (who seemingly misses 20-plus games every year and is coming off yet another serious injury), Gallinari (averaging 23.7 missed games a year over the last three seasons) and Beverley (19.5 missed games per year over his four full seasons in the league) in particular.

The Clippers have been able to weather injuries to Griffin and/or Paul in the past, but that’s because the other guy was usually on the floor to pick up the slack. Losing Griffin for a prolonged period this season would likely prove disastrous, and injuries to Beverley or Gallinari would hamper them considerably on both ends of the floor. What happens if they fall off so far that they’re totally uncompetitive in the first round, or if they miss the playoffs altogether? This is not exactly a team built in such a way that it can improve over the course of the next few seasons. Might there be a belated blow-up if the bottom falls out?

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For the first time in a while, there are more questions than answers when it comes to LA’s second (but best) team. We’re not sure what style they’ll play, we’re not sure how well they’ll play and we can’t be sure what to expect on any level. That’s thrilling on some level, but also a bit worrisome. It’ll be fascinating to see how it all plays out.