What causes NBA draft busts? Part 3: Intelligence and decision-making

Why do NBA Draft prospects fail? Our four-part series looks at the 2011-2015 NBA Drafts and why they didn’t make it. Part one looked at functional strength. Part two looked at skill development. Part three focuses on the mental game: awareness and decision-making.

In parts one and two of this series, we addressed tangible reasons for NBA Draft busts. Lack of strength and skill development are things that are relatively easy to pick up over the trajectory of a player’s career — either a player can’t win physical battles with opponents, or a player’s skill level remains fairly stagnant. The ways in which these things matter are subtle, but you can tell from a highlight film that at the NBA level, Jimmer Fredette isn’t strong enough to do much, and Emmanuel Mudiay’s shooting has been a consistent nightmare.

The third category of ways top-20 picks fail out is less obvious, but is even more important. The physical side of the game can separate the good players from the great players, but the mental side of the game is what more often decides between championship contenders and pretenders, playoff teams and lottery teams, and valuable role players and 10-day contract earners. The ability to make good decisions, be in the right spot, and make the play that leads up to the play is consistently what wins games at the NBA level. It’s become one of the core tenants of the draft evaluation philosophy at the Step Back, and it’s also one of the hardest things to improve on at the NBA level in a meaningful way if you aren’t already at a certain level.

These mental aspects of the game are so important that they can undo physical gifts and elite skill play in players who aren’t at a certain level in this department. You can have the length and the strength to match up with the elite in the NBA, and you can have some impressive ball skills. But if you can’t put yourself in spots to succeed, and you can’t keep yourself from creating negative possessions for your team, then that’s how you get Anthony Randolph — a physically gifted and skilled player with a body that teams salivated over for years, but who has spent the last four years in Russia and Spain because you couldn’t trust him to do basic things on the NBA court.

Much like the other categories so far, decision-making and awareness mean different things for different positions. We’re going to explore each in detail, and the ways each position relies on these traits to do their jobs on the floor through the lens of those who couldn’t pull it off.

Selling Points: Shot-making, hands

Demise: Traded to Brooklyn with a second-round pick for Tyler Zeller

We start with an area that’s not too hard to pick up on: shot selection. It’s felled many a talented on-ball scorer in the NBA, although Rashad Vaughn is the best recent example. A 6-foot-6 2-guard from UNLV with a good handle and the ability to pull-up from deep in college, Vaughn had the tools to be a 3-and-D-plus wing in the mold of a Bogdan Bogdanovic type that was long enough to be a good defender, a good enough shooter to space the floor, and could put the ball on the floor when needed. However, that never materialized, because Vaughn never totally shed the gunner mentality that he relied on in college.

Vaughn leaned in hard to catch-and-shoot volume upon coming into the league, averaging 5.7 3-point attempts per game in his career and shooting 147 3s out of 266 total shots in his rookie season. But his shooting wasn’t good enough to demand that type of volume, as he hit just 33.7 percent from long range. Vaughn’s mechanics weren’t sound enough to consistently convert from outside under pressure, and he struggled to get good separation on the perimeter on designed plays. That led to a lot of jumpers under pressure, and he never showed the awareness to bail out of contested shots.

Bad shot selection is typically thought of as Nick Young-style pull-up jumpers, and Vaughn had his fair share of those too. But it can also manifest in off-ball shooting when a player doesn’t recognize the odds of success in a given situation. Stephen Curry and Kyle Korver can bomb away with three players draped on them because they’re two of the best pure shooters in NBA history. Vaughn, who has never been even an above-average shooter, was a negative for his team’s offense by having the same “let it rip” mentality. Combined with his propensity to pull up in open space on pick-and-rolls, Vaughn was rarely taking the best shot for the team’s situation.

It’s difficult to outgrow that gunner mentality, or turn it into something useful at the NBA level. You have to have elite talent for that skill archetype, and even then, the ceiling is as a Lou Williams type.

The red flags are often there in college. Vaughn had great numbers as a No. 1 option at UNLV, but his team numbers weren’t great with him on the floor, and the offense didn’t suffer significant drop-off with him on the bench, despite Vaughn being the best primary initiator the team had. This is a common thread through a lot of guys with this type of issue — Jordan Crawford at Xavier, potentially Kevin Porter Jr. at USC — and points to an unwillingness or misunderstanding for the types of shots that are most efficient in running an offense.

Selling Points: Strength, defensive versatility

Demise: Traded to New Orleans in three-team deal that netted Detroit Thon Maker

Shot selection isn’t always about making the best read in a situation. Sometimes, it’s as simple as knowing what you’re good at. Stanley Johnson is 6-foot-7 and 245 pounds of thick, jacked frame, and is a very good power finisher at the rim. And yet, he has never posted a true shooting percentage over 50 percent because of his shot distribution.

Johnson’s heat map looks like that of an elite off-ball shooter like Eric Gordon or Joe Ingles, but he’s a career 29.3 percent 3-point shooter. Meanwhile, he has two seasons of over 64 percent finishing at the rim, but he took just 12 and 22 percent of his shots within three feet of the basket in those years. Now, growing up in a Stan Van Gundy system does have a role here, as the Pistons did develop Johnson with the goal of trying to turn him into a Rashard Lewis variant that could space the floor and create off the dribble while defending 4s.

But even off the dribble, Johnson doesn’t play to his strengths. Johnson should try to win with his strength, leveraging his body into opponents on drives to carve out space. Too often though, Johnson relies on his rudimentary handle to try to get opponents off balance, leading to off-balance attacks that have a low chance of converting.

Johnson is a very good player when he drives with a full head of steam and can get into a defender. However, he doesn’t do this often enough, and he too often settles for jumpers and trying to do something flashy. We often talk about on-ball initiators settling for harder shots, but off-ball role players can do that too, despite having the tools to do better.

Selling Points: Passing vision, off-dribble shooting

Demise: Traded to Chicago in package for Taj Gibson; waived in Year 4

It cannot be overstated how much of the difficulty with transition from the lower level to the NBA has to do with the speed of the game. Windows that are present at the college level close quicker in the NBA, as size, athleticism and recognition from defenses make gaps smaller and opportunities more fleeting. For point guards, especially those coming from the lower levels, the degree to which you need to have good timing and passing touch is probably greater than any other skill in the league, especially if you aren’t an elite scorer.

That was the major issue for Cameron Payne, who came into the league with a reputation as a decent scoring prospect that was an efficient ball-handler and good decision-maker. Much like Ja Morant this past year, Payne carried a massive load on a less talented Murray State team, and his passing was a major reason for the team’s competence around him. It was good enough to keep the offense churning for the Racers, but in the NBA, Payne had a very difficult time adjusting.

In limited minutes, Payne has proved to be very turnover-prone, particularly this past season, when he posted a turnover rate of 15.7 percent. Payne has the vision to be a good passer, but he lacks the touch, and more importantly, the timing to make full use of it. Payne can see the play as it develops, but his ability to complete passes with enough time to get his teammate a good shot isn’t at an acceptable level.

It isn’t just about whether you can see the passes you want to make; you have to physically fit the ball into the window you want it to go in, and you have to do it at the precise moment that will put your teammate in the best spot to succeed. This is the real value of Trae Young — in addition to being a dynamite outside shooter that commands a ton of attention, he also is such an advanced passer at this stage that he puts his teammates in optimal positions to succeed off of that attention. Timing is everything at the point guard position, and if you don’t have it, it’s very difficult to redeem yourself.

Selling Points: Rebounding, strength

Demise: Traded three times on rookie deal, waived by Denver during Year 3

Timing is huge for guards on offense, and it’s huge for bigs on defense. Much in the same way that point guards need to time their passes, big men need to be able to time rotations and contests to be able to get in optimal position to block shots. It’s not just about having the length and athleticism to close the space to the ball-handler to make a block; everything that leads up to that moment sets you up for success or failure. Anticipation is key when you’re the last man back and are responsible for defending both the rim and a man, and you need to be able to keep tabs on the player you’re guarding while watching a play develop in front of or around you.

Losing that battle was what undid Thomas Robinson’s career on defense. While he was saddled with an antiquated post scoring and energy role on offense, Robinson had a reputation as a quality fundamental defender at Kansas, and there was reason for optimism that it would translate to the NBA level thanks to his physical tools.

But that didn’t happen, as Robinson only had one season with a block rate over 2.0, and his lineups consistently floundered on the defensive side of the ball due to the inability to both slide on the perimeter and protect the rim. Robinson struggled with the increased speed of action, and his anticipation of drives as they developed caused him to deal with foul trouble. Lack of effort was also an issue, especially later on in his career, but it’s very difficult to support the back line of an NBA defense if you can’t anticipate action quick enough.

Selling Points: Athleticism, finishing, shooting

Demise: Traded to Sacramento for Luc Mbah a Moute

Like Robinson, Derrick Williams also had trouble with his offensive skill-set, but the mental side of defense undid him. Williams got overinflated due to an outlier 3-point shooting year where he shot 56.8 percent from outside on 74 attempts as a sophomore, but that wasn’t why he teetered on the edge of the league after his fourth season in the league.

Williams was still a fairly useful offensive player thanks to his finishing, even though his shooting never materialized in any real way. The problem was the lapses that plagued him throughout his career on defense. Williams was marketed as a versatile defender able to defend across three positions in the NBA, but in reality, he was limited to one position by his inability to make reads and decisions on the perimeter.

Williams had the length and agility to stay with bigger wings on one-on-one drives, but he struggled to recognize plays as they developed, and his propensity for late rotations made him a liability.

Williams struggled to become a useful stretch-4 because of his lack of 3-point touch, but he was undone by an inability to play the 3 on both ends. Defensively, Williams’s poor rotations and lack of awareness off ball made him a huge liability despite his size, and he never really grew out of that, even as he grew into a more comfortable role as a slasher in New York and Miami later in his career. Like Anthony Randolph, his transition into being a more full-time big in EuroLeague with Bayern Munich has allowed him to play more to his strengths, but that skill-set isn’t a useful player at the NBA level. With better awareness defensively, Williams could’ve been something more.

Selling Points: Length, outside shooting, rebounding

Demise: Traded from Portland to Chicago for a draft-and-stash player named Milovan Rakovic

There are few better case studies in this category than Noah Vonleh, who entered the 2014 NBA Draft with perhaps one of the worst cases of lack of feel we’ve seen in the last decade. While Williams and Robinson were plagued by this issue on defense, and Johnson and Payne struggled most on offense, Vonleh wasn’t able to provide value on either end of the floor thanks to this issue.

Offensively, Vonleh has mostly been a turnover-prone mess, a player who routinely missed open teammates and couldn’t be charged with any meaningful usage thanks to a lack of on-ball creativity. Defensively, Vonleh struggled with similar timing issues to Robinson, but exacerbated by a lack of awareness of complex actions. Vonleh is routinely back cut by opponents off-ball, and he misses rotations completely when defending a quality offensive player on the ball.

In New York this past year, Vonleh did finally start to put things together on the offensive end, recognizing open teammates to the tune of a career-high 2.7 assists per game, and cutting down on on-ball turnovers. But his defense was still mostly bad, and he is so far behind the eight ball in terms of recognizing even simple situations. His aversion to rotating over to help is a huge limiting factor for his potential to stick in the league long-term.

Vonleh’s struggles betray not just a lack of awareness, but a lack of understanding of defensive concepts. This can be perhaps the hardest aspect of evaluating a player to pick up, but it’s also the most dooming area of this category.

Selling Points: Athleticism, face-up game, size

Demise: Traded to Minnesota for first-round pick, Year 4 option declined

The knock on Adreian Payne heading into the draft was that he struggled to pick up the more advanced concepts of the Michigan State defense until his senior season, and that seemingly small detail ended up being the reason for his swift exit from the league. (There was also the sexual assault incident, but Payne was already on the fringe when that surfaced, and we’re keeping things fairly light here).

Payne’s inability to pick up on the concepts of the Hawks’ defense was a well-known problem by December of 2014, and he played just three games in Atlanta before he was put on the trading block by Mike Budenholzer. His run with Minnesota wasn’t much more fruitful, as Payne remained mostly glued to the bench due to the same issues. Payne would routinely go off script defensively, getting himself out of position or not feeding an opponent towards the rest of the help.

This can be one of the hardest things to evaluate with draft prospects, because college defenses are a lot simpler than NBA defensive systems, and we only get a short time with which to see the progression of learning of those concepts. Once the player gets to the NBA, this issue most commonly manifests in lack of playing time, and that can make it hard to discern that reasoning.

But if a player routinely finds himself out of position (like Vonleh) or is pulled from crucial situations (like Payne would be defensively at Michigan State), it’s a good bet that lack of feel or understanding of the mental side of the game is why — and that this issue is going to continue to be a problem at the NBA level.