Oct 6, 2014; San Diego, CA, USA; Los Angeles Lakers head coach Byron Scott talks to media before the game against the Denver Nuggets at Valley View Casino Center. Mandatory Credit: Jake Roth-USA TODAY Sports
As Zach Lowe is fond of saying, the war is over. A place has been carved out for analytics in essentially every NBA organization, statistical analysis is not going anywhere. Although the war may be over, battles are still being fought in a variety of areas and none more fiercely than in the area of shot selection.
A recent piece by Jorge Castillo, of the Washington Post, included this quote from Washington Wizards Head Coach, Randy Wittman:
At a time when advanced metrics have infiltrated the NBA, statisticians have concluded “long twos” — outside the paint, inside the three-point arc — are the least efficient shot in basketball. Wittman admits he is not one for numbers.
“We’re going to take open shots,” Wittman emphasized. “If a team wants to give us mid-range open shots, we’re going to take them. I’m going to tell a guy that has a wide-open 15-foot jumper to take three steps back and shoot a three? I’m not going to do that.”
The thing is, Wittman is right. In many instances, and constrained to the narrow circumstances he laid out above, the open 15-foot jumper is often the better option. Relinquishing open space in favor of retreating backwards and then trying to shoot as the defense recovers is likely a losing proposition for most players. Obviously, there are many other factors including time left on the shot clock and game clock, the score of the game and the player actually holding the ball. That being said Wittman’s basic point is true — three-pointers are more efficient than long two-pointers in the aggregate, but not in every situation.
The problem is when those situations become the framework, when the purpose of the offense becomes seeking out those scenarios. Trying to build an offense on the exception, rather than the rule, means largely negating the aggregate benefit of a shot selection pattern tilted towards three-pointers. In the situation Wittman laid out above, it would be defensible for John Wall or Bradley Beal to pull up and take the shot. But when Wittman allows, or even encourages, Wall and Beal to hunt for those shots, as was often the case last year, it is to the detriment of the entire offense. Open 15-footers, in the hands of the players who should take them, are not that easy to find and efforts to create them often lead to much more inefficient plan B’s (like contested, pull-up 15-footers).
Which brings us to Byron Scott. On Tuesday night, the Los Angeles Lakers lost by 18 points to the Houston Rockets and continued Scott’s stated mission of trying to keep the Lakers under 15 three-point attempts per game. They succeeded night, taking just 10. To be clear, the Lakers didn’t get blown out just because of their shot selection, but it was certainly a factor. In their second game, another blowout at the hand of the Phoenix Suns, they took just 13 three-pointers.
Scott’s goal is to encourage his team to attack the basket. It’s an admirable goal but misguided in execution — in the words of Seth Partnow, “it appears that “three pointers” and “attacking the rim” is not an either/or decision, but a yes/and one.” To some degree, that’s what we’ve seen from the Lakers so far. They’ve been to the rim a fair number of times — 48 FGA in the Restricted Area — but they also took 67 mid-range jumpers (making just 21). This falls right in line with the patterns they began establishing in the preseason.
Between Scott and Wittman we see two coaches with some misunderstandings about the message basketball analytics is offering about long two-pointers, three-pointers and shot selection in general. Wittman is making a micro-argument (which shots are best in specific situations) about a macro-issue (which shots are best for his team to try and create). Scott is struggling with the same macro-issue, but mostly because he’s misunderstanding the relationship between shots at the rim and three-pointers.
Both coaches are working with a misunderstanding is bigger than the relative value of two and three-point baskets. While it’s framed as an analytics discussion this really about understanding the strengths, weaknesses and preferences of players and how best to put them in positions to succeed. Wall and Beal are capable of attacking the basket and that’s where the majority of their drives should end. The Lakers don’t have the same quality of penetrators and, without a legitimate post threat besides Kobe, attacking the rim is often indistinguishable from forcing the issue.
Analytics offers some general rules of thumb about which shots to pursue. The final determining factors should be how open the shot is and the personnel involved. That, ultimately, is where Scott and Wittman seem most disconnected from conventional wisdom.