The Evening Redness in the West: The Demise of the Portland Trail Blazers

The LaMarcus Aldridge-Damian Lillard era is gone. It has disappeared as swiftly as it materialized. The Portland franchise rebuilt after the Brandon Roy-Greg Oden injuries decimated one of the most promising young cores. They gave up a piece in the infamous Nets trade, trading up an aging Gerald Wallace for a draft pick that transformed into Lillard. It was a admirable rebuild, and this was done with the memories of all the recent lottery seasons and the Jailblazers in mind; and it was quickly accomplished. Yet that iteration of the team is, again, gone, and it’s not for a powerful, unavoidable reason. They just left.

The 2014 season was an accomplishment because it ended on a high note, eliminating a higher-seeded Rockets team with an instantly immortalized last second shot; the 2015 season was a disappointment because it ended with the team torn apart with injuries. But both seasons displayed a strong club that could play at a high level with its best guys in, and a well-balanced club that was rounding out its weaknesses on defense and on the bench. It was a fairly young core too, and there were no glaring chemistry issues or a problem with the front office not being willing to spend.

What’s sad here is that we didn’t get to see what this team could do. They had their breakout season, Wesley Matthews went down for the year, and that was it — Aldridge left, and in his wake a few others followed. The lost opportunities are what people can’t forget, even decades later. They haunt the dark corners of our brain, nagging us with a sense of what could have been and what should have been.

The Catalyst

The starting lineup was established when Portland let Denver sign their 2013 starting center, J.J. Hickson, and traded for Robin Lopez, a wholly unremarkable center who had had only one good season prior to the acquisition. By some conventional analysis, Hickson was productive for the Blazers, racking up double doubles and putting up a season only matched by Dwight Howard: at least 12 points and 10 rebounds a game with a FG% of 55. But Hickson was one of the most overrated players via RAPM (adjusted ridge regression plus/minus) despite the rebounding and efficiency numbers. Amazingly, the latest long-term RAPM model has him ranked 1451st out of 1467.

What was RAPM seeing that others weren’t? Hickson’s a pretty terrible defensive player, and as a center it’s even more of a problem because of his size. He’s never had good rim protection numbers, and his steal and block stats are pretty weak. Over the past three seasons among players with at least 3000 minutes, Hickson was 79th out of 259 players in blocked shots per possession, which is disappointing for someone who often plays center, and he was 204th out of 259 players in steals per possession. He doesn’t really do any of the “little things” like pick up charges either. In fact, scouts would agree in concert here[1. You can see here how Zach Lowe critiques Hickson’s defense as being someone who cannot protect the rim nor come out to guard smaller guys. There’s some discussion here about how Hickson messed up Portland’s scheme by being out of position frequently.] that he’s a poor defender and we’ve had little numerical evidence to indicate otherwise; he apparently only significantly contributes with his defensive rebounding.

However, J.J. Hickson’s rebounding numbers are a bit of a mirage. He’s one of the prime examples of what you’d call a rebound stealer, i.e. someone who pads his rebounding stats by grabbing the easy ones and taking some others that teammates could have had. There’s no question the defensive rebound stat is misleading, and you can see a thorough breakdown here. Since we don’t have public data on boxing out or anything else more nuanced on team rebounding, we can’t see a player’s numbers and assume it translates to the team level. But there are other ways of adjusting the stats, like using an adjusted regression model. For example, using the rebounding data here, Hickson is 18th in grabbing defensive boards per opportunity yet once you factor in the team adjustment he’s down to 118th out of the 445 listed players.

Robin Lopez, meanwhile, is one of the best “team rebounders” in the game and arguably the best. This definitely has a real value, and thus when Portland plugged him into Hickson’s position for the 2014 season they climbed from 13th in the defensive rebounding rankings, per b-ref, to 19th even though Hickson has grabbed 66% more boards per opportunity for his career than Lopez. Combined with Lopez’s rim protection, his defensive focus, his mascot crusade, and his door breaking, Portland found its missing piece and they leaped 21 wins, built on a potent starting five whose pieces complemented each other well. It’s not coincidence that J.J. had never had a season with a positive on-off stat, via b-ref — meaning, his teams have always played better with him on the bench, even though he’s started 298 out of a possible 499 games, and it wasn’t even close with his best season at -3.3 points per 100 possessions and an average of -6.6 [2. What’s amazing is that Hickson accomplished this even though he started 73 games next to LeBron James in 2010. They were just significantly better with him on the bench and were just a little above average when he played even though they won 61 games.].

The Fearsome Five

Before Matthews suffered a torn Achilles injury, the starting lineup was outscoring its opponents 12.2 points per 100 possessions, which rated as the 12th best lineup with at least 300 possessions in 2015, out of 60 total lineups. Most of those 60 lineups are the NBA’s best lineups, all the starting units with a few highly used bench variations. Portland rated right near the infamously potent Clippers starting unit and the Spurs starters with Diaw instead of Splitter. They ranked above Atlanta’s core, Houston’s best, and Dallas’ starting unit before Rondo when they were wrecking the league with their offense. They were very good in 2014 as well, ranking 21st and nearly even with the best from the Thunder, the Grizzlies, and the Rockets.

Table: top lineups 2015, via-bref (min. 300 possessions)

In comparison with recent champions, a 12.2 net efficiency rating with your starters isn’t far off — the Spurs were +19 the year before they won, yes, but the Warriors were a mere +13.5 in a little over a hundred possessions in 2014 and Miami was surprisingly low at +8.5 in 2012 (Chalmers-Wade-LeBron-Bosh-Haslem). With some internal improvement and a good bench, you can certainly make a deep playoff run with Portland’s old starting unit and with some luck a title is a real possibility.

The five starters just meshed well together. Lillard was the lead ballhandler and he’s shown some explosive shooting ability early in his career, but he’s not a ballhog either. Batum was perfectly suited to a secondary ballhandler role as a surprisingly capable passer for his size. Yet Aldridge was the fulcrum for the offense: they played through him, he drew double teams, and he could always bail them out with his patented turnaround jump shot if they had no other options. Wesley Matthews was the underrated offensive cog as a high volume three-point gunner with a good post-up game that meant you could not hide poor defensive players on him or, consequently, anywhere. Robin Lopez was unheralded and, well, an awkward moving behemoth, but his screens were valuable, he fought hard for offensive rebounds near the basket, and he was a decent enough scorer that he could be used in pick and rolls or even as a low-post option. The floor was spaced beautifully, usually with Lopez on the low block opposite Aldridge in the high post with three shooters surrounding them.

There were numerous options to hurt opposing defenses, they were the rare outside shooting menace who could crash the boards, and they could punish smaller teams — Aldridge is 6′ 11″ with long arms and a Dirk-esque fadeaway shot that’s tough to contest — while not sacrificing spacing. Doubling someone usually would translate into an open three-pointer somewhere, and putting your center on Aldridge to contest his shots usually gave Robin Lopez an easier time at snatching a miss. Terry Stotts should be mentioned here for developing a cohesive team with a powerful offense and an extremely conservative defensive scheme that started to work well, choking out open three-pointers while allowing post-up guys like Dwight Howard to get their numbers one-on-one.

The parts matched well, and it made sense on defense too. Aldridge was a nimble guy for someone with the size of a center, but he was better off with someone taking the center duties, which worked well with Robin Lopez. Also, Lopez has always been willing to cede his own defensive boards for his teammates, working well with Aldridge, and he was a pretty good rim protector in the right system. Lillard is a sieve, but they hid him with two defenders in the tenacious Matthews and Batum, who had a Marion-like ability to chase around much smaller players.

In fact, you can track the perception of Lillard with how the team was doing. Not too long ago, the first aspects that sprang to mind when he was mentioned had to do with his clutch shooting, which was verified with numbers. He was known for his big playoff shot and his fearlessness in similar situations. When the team went sideways, so did his reputation, and few people cited his 13th rank in ESPN’s wins added from RPM last season. He wasn’t labeled one of the best players in the league and he wasn’t revered like a few other statistical darlings who climbed the RPM chart.

With parts that fit, you had a team that could shoot like one of the better offenses in the league with a pretty sturdy defense. It wasn’t really all luck either; over two seasons opponents shot 36% on three-pointers, which is hardly anomalous. They beat opponents by outworking them in nearly every facet, especially on free throws. Then Matthews got injured, and it all disappeared.

Afflalo was the shooting guard equivalent to J.J. Hickson in the starting lineup — they were incredibly 17 points worse per 100 possessions with him instead of Matthews[3. What I find most remarkable is that Afflalo had the benefit of playing with a post-slump Batum, whose all-star shooting splits are extreme. Imagine how bad the numbers could have been if Batum wasn’t in a slump when Matthews was healthy.]. Despite his defensive reputation, which I found to be bogus, and his shooting prowess that peaked when he scored 18 points a game with good percentages for Orlando, plus/minus has never loved him, just like Hickson. Before the 2015 season, for instance, he was rated at -1.7 in a 14 year RAPM model — that’s far below average and near what the average rookie is. The problem people have with assessing a player is that we often accentuate their strengths and ignore a few periphery categories, assuming they have a negligible difference because we don’t think about them. For instance, Afflalo is ranked 240 out of 259 players with at least 3000 minutes in offensive rebound rate, although for an outside shooting guard that’s not far from normal. But he’s also ranked 246th in blocks and 242nd in steals. Plus, according to NBAMiner, he’s only drawn two charges in his career.

Free agency broke up the lineup permanently. Matthews was a highly coveted piece after the injury, paradoxically, because it demonstrated his value, and he’s on the road to restoration. Aldridge left for a dream of a title with the Spurs. Batum was traded after a down season. Robin Lopez took his sideshow act to the circus in New York. One of the most surprisingly effective teams was gutted, and we’ll never have an opportunity to see just how good they could be together.

The Moment

At the end of game six in the first round of the 2014 playoffs with only 0.9 seconds left on the clock, Damian Lillard drained a long three-point shot on the move. The buzzer sounded as the ball was mid-air, and the Rockets were eliminated.

Some details are lost to time. A few seconds before the shot, Lillard stepped out of bounds and gave the ball right back to Houston. The game was tied, and Harden pulled-up for a jump shot with a handful of seconds remaining. He missed, but Parsons tipped the ball in and the game appeared to be theirs. That’s a mirror image of what happened on the next play, when Lillard became the hero and Parsons got beat.

The game-winning shot was built on Houston enforcing a no-switch philosophy for the last 0.9 seconds and, naturally, Harden’s defensive influence. During the set-up, Harden told Chandler to switch onto Lillard, who had previously been covered by the pesky Beverley. Unfortunately, as Houston was still communicating, Lillard took advantage of the situation and sprinted to the other side of the court. Houston obviously didn’t want to give up any solid three-point attempts being down two points, and they were expecting a lob to Aldridge. But their defense broke down and their no-switch policy meant Lillard got away.

The shot was vital for the franchise because the team had the longest active second playoff round drought in the league. At time it felt like the ascending burst from a new young star, as the miracle heave was a sign of things yet to come. But this is the same league where Arenas self-destructs after he firmly commands attention as a new force in the league while Andre Miller keeps going and going, and the same league where Yao Ming retires due to repeated injuries while Nazr Mohammed cracks 1000 games played. There is no fairness or just gods here. What happens happens, and we assign meaning afterwards.

That moment, the shot, will remain a highlight for Portland fans or the foreseeable future. But it’s unclear what meaning it will have years from now. It could be a sign of good fortune with Lillard’s playoff prowess or it could be a blip in the timeline, a diversion in the history of the Blazers that ultimately means nothing. Whatever happens, in that moment, in the celebration and the cheering and the confusion, Portland was happy, and it’s a moment that can’t be stolen.

The Virtue of Patience

Winning an NBA title can be a long process. The most recent champions are the Warriors, Spurs, Heat, the Mavericks, and Lakers. The Warriors rushed on the scene quickly, but the Spurs have had the core of Duncan, Parker, and Giniboli for over a decade — and, of course, Duncan has been there since the late 90’s. The Heat brought in LeBron for a couple titles, but they’ve had Wade since he was a rookie and he didn’t leave even during the lean years. The Lakers kept Kobe too, of course, and they rebuilt their team after a down period before snatching two titles. The Mavericks are a great example: they had been competing with a Dirk-led team for roughly a decade before bringing home the ultimate trophy.

Aldridge, in fact, is in some ways a version of Dirk Nowitzki. Both guys are midrange specialists, firing up high volumes with nigh unblockable fadeaways. Dirk, like Aldridge, had stayed with Dallas for over a decade and the entirety of his career before his contract expired in his early 30’s. Although in retrospect it seems obvious now, there was a bit of fear before Dirk re-signed for four more years because Dallas had experienced heavy playoff disappointment. The following season, the Mavericks won the title and using hindsight bias we painted Dirk’s career differently, detailing how he progressed in stages and how all the failures were important for his growth. The Rockets actually had more issues with Olajuwon in the early 90’s. They had missed the playoffs and were a first round doormat in the other years. He demanded a trade, feeling that the franchise did not provide him with enough talent. Yet he stayed, Houston kept its best player, and they built a two-time champion. This also happened in the 70’s with the Bullets who had Wes Unseld and Elvin Hayes. They seemingly peaked in 1975 and failed to win a title, but they hung around and were remarkably fortunate there was a power vacuum at the top in the NBA at the time, winning a championship with a 44 win season.

This is not to say Aldridge is as good as Dirk or Olajuwon. But those examples illustrate how NBA teams can be built on patience and that resetting after only a couple years is probably foolish. Aldridge and Lillard don’t look like MVPs now, but no one said that about Curry pretty recently. Oddly enough, FiveThirtyEight ran a projection for estimated titles from before the 2015 playoffs to 2019, and Portland rated fairly well at eighth overall [4. Surprisingly, they rated above the Spurs too]. It’s tough to know what’s good enough to truly compete until it happens.

Sometimes a team just needs a little bit of time and an opportunity. The Spurs were ran over in the 90’s with David Robinson, but they kept their best player and he became part of the first phase of the mini dynasty with Duncan. In 1984, Detroit had a fairly decent team, winning 49 games, with Isiah Thomas, Laimbeer, and Vinnie Johnson; they were nothing special. But they kept their core together, picked up Dumars and Rodman, and eventually won two championships in a row. There’s nothing crippling about just being a “good” team without contender status. Your best chance at moving up a level is keeping your best players because they are, obviously, the keystones to building a legitimate contender.

Twilight Hours

The fault here isn’t with the Portland front office. Aldridge made a decision, and Dallas threw a huge stack of money at a player who had a debilitating injury. They remade the team quickly, bringing in young talent. Noah Vonleh is probably the best rebuilding piece to buy — he was a lottery talent, barely played so he was off the radar of most teams, and he has a unique skillset as a long defensive power forward with range. Those are the smart moves you make when you can accept that one era has commenced.

For Portland fans, this is tough to accept. Few other franchises have had a higher ratio of playoff appearances to lottery berths, but it’s translated into only one title. There have been a handful of contending teams[5. There’s 1978 club that was marked for a repeat before the Walton injury. Then there’s the Drexler era in the 80’s and early 90’s where they made two finals appearances. Portland nearly defeated the eventual champions, the Lakers, during a 59 win season with a deep, balanced team.  The Brandon Roy era peaked with a 54 win season. And finally, there’s the now defunct Aldridge-Lillard era.], and in some ways fans are grateful they’ve enjoyed so many winning seasons. But there’s a restlessness now and a growing sense of anxiety among the fanbase. After the Jailblazer era and the doomed injuries of Roy and Oden, Lillard and the rest of the starters felt like saviors, but with how quickly they’ve disbanded the anxiety is close to a panic. You can understand why a team would need to so thoroughly rebuild, but the perception is different for fans.

This isn’t about dumping more complaints into the world. There’s a sadness with every lost opportunity. They weren’t as flashy as, say, the early 2000’s Kings, so they won’t be remembered by everyone, but somewhere midway through the season they looked like a legitimate contender. Given their offensive and defensive ratings in early January, one general method I have would give them 24% odds to win a title before any other adjustments — they looked the part, and instead of regaining their health and shoring up weaknesses that team is gone.

Let’s say farewell to a team that experienced a sliver of the NBA world and dissipated like smoke. Let’s say farewell to a combination of players that induced some special spark and lit the league on fire for a few precious moments. Let’s say farewell to the surprise of the 2014 season and the disappointment of the 2015 season. Let’s say farewell.

This is a requiem for an NBA team, one that never reached the typical of mythical status that brands teams for immortality. It’s a requiem for the very good. There will be Portland teams better than the ones we just saw in the future. We don’t know when it will happen, but time is a deep well.

We do not need pity here. We do not need to label the Blazers as a doomed franchise in a conference of lions. The bleak dichotomy of the NBA — title or bust, 29 failures every season — creates this toxic atmosphere where every setback is made out to be an order of magnitude worse than it seems and only the negative future projections are discussed. But we can enjoy the sport for what it is and the tailing moments that follow and embed themselves in our memories.

The signs of dawn are already there. There are some promising young players on the team already, and Lillard is already a star. This is probably ideal timing too — Golden State is one of the toughest clubs in a long time, and veteran-laden teams like the Spurs and Clippers are tough for any round.

The Blazers had one defining moment with that team. And in a league where turnover is high and history advances ferociously, we should be thankful for that. I just would have loved to see what could have been had they stayed together a little while longer.

But they’re gone.