2016 NBA objective draft grades

Now that the NBA draft (aka NBA Christmas) has come and gone and the dust has settled, it is time to evaluate how each team performed with regards to managing the NBA draft (Well, I’m pretty late to the party). Typically, this is done via “draft grades”, an increasingly common exercise performed by many writers and media outlets.

I wrote NBA Objective Draft Grades last year. I hope it was enjoyed, but for all I know it was read by no one. The idea was born out of an overwhelming frustration with many draft grades articles published post draft, even and often especially including those published at major media outlets. I am unfortunately publishing this piece several days late this year, but that lateness afforded me an opportunity to look at many draft grades before putting together this flavor of them.

Unfortunately, little has changed in overall draft grade quality between this year and last, in my opinion, though there are several draft grades/reactions that I do highly respect and encourage reading, especially from a more subjective view.

When I speak of my overwhelming frustration with the current state of draft grades pieces, I do not (necessarily) mean simple disagreement with my own opinions on draft prospects or my own draft model results. I’m not that high and mighty (hopefully). Instead, what I mean is an overwhelming consistency of many draft grades pieces to…

-Give favorable grades to many or all teams. (Think lowest grade, B-. No seriously, this happens at some of the biggest websites every year.)

-Pay little to no regard to return vs. expected return and instead focus only on the overall haul while paying little attention to what that haul cost to obtain.

-Have a wild misunderstanding of the value of draft positions relative to each other.

-Have an exceedingly optimistic outlook for draft prospects, especially those with a very low chance of ever playing in the league.

Many draft grades pieces provide a horrendous combination of all four of these flaws. The first may be the most egregious, as the NBA is essentially a zero-sum environment. Taking for yourself almost certainly means depriving someone else. No mutual growth here. Since success is relative, it doesn’t make much sense for most grades to be positive.

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To the point of the next flaw, a team should not be rewarded with the idea that they had a “good draft” simply because they were picking with one of the top picks. Sure, these picks will yield players with the most optimistic future, but if the purpose of draft grades is to judge the team based on how well they performed over the night, then the expected return of that team’s beginning assets must be considered. The “average” front office is more than capable of determining that they should draft Ben Simmons first overall, and reaching that conclusion doesn’t make them clairvoyant and worthy of an A+.

In that vein, my draft grades are generated by the following procedure:

First, I take a consensus of three different draft models (my own; Andrew Johnson’s, also of Nylon Calculus, and Kevin Pelton’s of ESPN). I choose these three models not only because I respect the authors, their results, and their methodology, but also because for each I was able to get a continuous projected value for all major draft prospects. I combined the three by scaling them into the range of my own target variable, a feature that represents the wins accounted for by a player’s two year peak of a RAPM, BPM, Win Share combination. It doesn’t really matter whose projected results range I scale the other two base models into, I just chose my own because I understand what that value represents the most, for obvious reasons. The numbers you see further along the line can be thought of as wins that a player is projected to represent at his peak.

In order to grade each team, I assigned the potential value of every draft position in the 2016 NBA draft as the projected value that the aforementioned derived consensus model would have drafted at that position. Selecting a player that the model projected to be of higher value then his draft slot, would result in a net expected profit, a pattern of which would manifest itself into a higher grade for a given team. Consistently drafting below the assigned value of the draft slot would produce the opposite effect. I did not define the draft picks by their historical results because each draft is unique. (Though I will reference historical value soon.)

When evaluating trades that featured more than just current draft picks, I used the involved players’ two year peak of a RAPM, BPM, Win Share combination that I use as the training and projected values in my own draft model process. In the event that future first or second rounders were involved, I used the historical expected value of these picks, based on the conditions applied to them, to assign value. While this approach does not consider attributes like a current NBA player’s career timing, injury status, or salary, it provides a rough template for value. I could be up all night assigning a more precise value to each current NBA player involved, but that is for another analysis.

Based on the projected return on investment given starting assets, I generated a raw letter grade for each team. This grade, represents, in a completely objective manner, how a consensus model and a rough player valuation approach would evaluate each team’s performance. This isn’t to say the approach of the raw grade is perfect, (it is in fact, far, far, far, from it) it is simply to say that I have completely isolated my own personal opinions and feelings about the NBA draft, player value, and team potential from it.

So let’s get started. The results are presented in the embed below, along with some brief personal thoughts on some of the team’s draft performance. Remember I’m treating grades here as they were originally intended: B is not average. C is average and not to be necessarily ashamed of. D is slightly below average, not failure. F is failure. Please also note that due to the absolute nature of the methodology, those teams that began or closed the draft with few assets with be closer to the average, and those that began or closed with many assets will be closer to the extremes.

Oklahoma City Thunder

This approach really likes the Ibaka trade for the Thunder and I see no reason to disagree. While I am comfortably a fan of Ibaka and the value he provides any team, a young Oladipo, Ersyan Ilyasova, and Sabonis Jr. is more than enough to offset that loss. If anything, this methodology undersells the benefit for the Thunder here.

Also, I was happy to see my fellow Husky Daniel Hamilton get drafted. Daniel Hamilton was considered a fringe lottery pick by my own draft model, and seemed to hang around the end of the first round in others. Allow me to be the first on the Daniel Hamilton train, and that’s not just the UConn in me talking. While he’s not explosively athletic, he has a unique combination of great body dimensions packed with gaudy rebound and assist rates.

Cleveland Cavaliers

Selling picks is bad. Buying picks can be good. Spinning to win on Kay Felder can also be good (potentially). The problem with Kay Felder, like Tyler Ulis, is that he’s so small. But fortunately for both of them, their wingspans are slightly longer than their height would suggest (wingspan is actually more important than just height). Kay Felder also had a responsible steal rate, and one of the best assist rates in the country last year.

Detroit Pistons

Henry Ellenson fell all the way to No. 18. My draft model, left to its own devices, would have taken him as early as 3, and the consensus I used here would have drafted him No 6. Ellenson probably will struggle defensively throughout the course of his career, but his attributes in other areas should have gotten him drafted earlier, and definitely over a few guys in the No. 11 to No. 17 range.

San Antonio Spurs

Dejounte Murray was surprisingly studly by my model, and the Spurs might have agreed, because they took him no. 29. Most big boards and subjective opinions had him going significantly earlier, so should be great value here, even if he doesn’t work out. The obvious comparable here is Kyle Anderson falling to the Spurs two years ago.

Minnesota Timberwolves

The Timberwolves had only one pick and they used it to pick exactly who they should have at No. 5. Cool example of the methodology here, with a perfect 0 for the Timberwolves for net profit. Kris Dunn is a player I thought should be considered at No. 3, despite his age, for if anything, a pretty nice lack of glaring concerns. Excellent wingspan and assist rate, and pretty decent across the board everywhere else. He should be a fun addition to the growing more and more fun young wolves.

Toronto Raptors

Jakob Poetl at No. 9 seems about right. He doesn’t offer much excitement as a prospect, but was No. 7 overall across the consensus. Several other models had him higher.

Houston Rockets

Like other teams with one or two picks, Houston’s grade was pushed to the middle. But I really liked their draft. They drafted Chinanu Onuaku and Zhon Qi, both of whom look really good under the lens of the right draft model. Andrew’s had Chinanu as the No. 17 best overall prospect, and Kevin had Zhon as the seventh. Still, second round picks often don’t move the needle much, even when they are steals, so it’s not enough for their score to overcome the center-driving effects of the methodology by dealing with few assets.

Philadelphia 76ers

Kudos to the Sixers for correctly drafting Ben Simmons. They should be very excited about him. As is always the case, there was considerable late debate over the No. 1 and No. 2 overall pick, and many knowledgeable folks had begun to lean Ingram about two months out. If you watch hours and hours of film and decide that Ingram is the play, power to you, and I respect your opinion.

If, however, you decided to take a more objectively invested approach, and you arrive at the conclusion that Ben Simmons is not either the runaway No. 1 overall pick or a very close No. 2, as some had, then I really don’t know what you’re looking at. Ben Simmons was an absolute complete package as a draft prospect; A 19 year old, No. 1 ranked high school recruit with excellent size, 20.7 points on 12.7 shots (points per 40 pace adjusted), 3.0 steals and blocks, and 18.1 rebounds and assists (No, seriously). Statistically speaking, a pretty clear number one pick.

Milwaukee Bucks

I have to careful with what I say here. As some of you no doubt know, Nylon overlord Seth Partnow now armchair quarterbacks for the Milwaukee Bucks, and so he has some of his eggs in this basket.

I do not overtly despise Thon Maker at 10. Skinny, raw but talented, and drafted higher because of YouTube hasn’t been working out that poorly with Kristaps Porzingis so far. If you don’t get excited by the idea of Giannis, Thon, and Jabari running down the court together than you need to get out. Milwaukee won’t get many cracks at the bat for superstars outside the draft, and Thon at the very least has a higher chance to become a superstar than the average 10th overall pick, however low that chance might be.

At the same time, there are an abundance of concerns. Absolutely inconclusive Reddit posts aside, there appears to be a debate about how old Thon Marker really is. Assuming there is some validity to these charges, allow me to make the following sweeping generalization: If you’re drafting an NBA prospect, you better be sure you know how old he is.

One may scoff at the difference between 19 and 23, but it’s all the difference in the world for an NBA prospect. Every year of prospect age is another year taken away from the seasons a player has until he hits the fateful 30, when the majority of basketball players’ production falls off a cliff due to deteriorating athleticism. Every year a prospect is older is also a year without NBA coaching, so there is both less time to be a good basketball player once developed, and less time to develop him. The effect is two-fold.

Thon also had the unique circumstance of being drafted without playing almost any high-level basketball, so his pre-draft statistics are pretty much non-existent. Kevin Pelton and I each lacked projections for him, and the projection Andrew Johnson has for him is either largely imputed or based on only a few minutes of play.

All of this makes for a pretty risky package at No. 10. But if you’ve watched those YouTube videos, you can wonder if it may be worth it. 7’1” kids with his level of coordination and talent aren’t falling out of trees.

Denver Nuggets

Jamal Murray is a good pick a No. 7, even if he’s not inspiring. He probably lacks the athleticism to be an elite player in the league, but he has the size and the scoring chops to get by. Denver has a phenomenal reputation for drafting overseas, so I’ll trust them on Juan. Not a big fan of selling picks though, and neither is the methodology.

Brooklyn Nets

Isiah Whitehead is an exceptional value for a second rounder. Caris LaVert isn’t really great bang for the buck at 20, but before injuries he was considered a potential lottery pick. The main reason for the negative objective grade for the Nets here is the offsetting value of dumping Thaddeus Young, which the methodology is almost certainly overrating. Nets probably did decently well here, and flexed their financial muscle a bit in the process. Still, I would have shied away from Caris LaVert at 20.

New Orleans Pelicans

Don’t draft shooting so early. It is the easiest skill to teach. It is also Buddy Hield’s strength. Hield is also already 22, so this just makes me sad for Anthony Davis, really. It’s not that I think Hield is a bad player I just don’t think his attributes are worth a No. 6 overall pick. For the players’ sake, I always hope I’m proven wrong in instances like this. I think a lot of people knew Hield was going to be over-drafted, and unfortunately it was the Pelicans that said “I will”.

Atlanta Hawks

I have no idea what happened here. Remember, this is what a year of Jeff Teague bought. Our three-model consensus wouldn’t have even drafted Taurean Prince in the first round, and other than super long arms, there’s not much I love here. He didn’t even do that well in pre-draft apparently.

Six players available at 12, just to name a few:
Henry Ellenson
Dejounte Murray
Deyonta Davis
Denzel Valentine
Diamond Stone
Brice Johnson

Orlando Magic

Though I am a fan of Serge Ibaka, I do think the Magic overpaid for him. Oladipo was a valuable young player, even if the Magic had success moving him to the bench. As of now their roster is pretty barren, and cashing in Oladipo and another pick for one year of Ibaka seems like the opposite of the direction they want to take.

Boston Celtics

I do not hate Jaylen Brown at No. 3. There was going to be a huge drop off between Brandon Ingram and whoever the Celtics took at 3 regardless. If they thought Brown was the play there, power to them. Brown is talented and has sneaky long arms, but lacks elite scoring prowess, solid passing ability, or next-level explosiveness, one of which is usually present in a guard/forward taken third overall.

But before I even get into all the value the Celtics demonstrably left on the table via this methodology, I would like to talk to the alleged value that the Celtics left on the table that this methodology doesn’t address. ESPN reported that the 76ers offered Nerlens Noel, the 24th pick, the 26th and Robert Covington for the third overall pick. I won’t begin to list all the rumors, but there were more than one shade of ridiculous floating around Thursday night. If the Celtics indeed had a trade offer like this on the table, and did not take it, I really don’t know what to say.

Despite injury concerns, Nerlens Noel still projects to be a stud, ranked 34th in defensive RPM last year, and just might be exactly what the Celtics need in order to fill our their young roster. Throw in late first round sweeteners in a deep draft and a legitimate NBA player in Robert Covington and you have wayyyyy more than this year’s third overall pick in value. Roster space at a premium? Move up in the draft with all those other picks you have.

Part of me thinks this rumor is just Ainge working the sources to drive his price up, but trade rumors like these seem too lopsided to be believable. Perhaps in the excitement of the draft such a trade can be believable to a fan less invested than I in basketball coverage, and leaking this rumor would work as a price inflation technique, but Ainge isn’t trying to game the weekend warriors. He’s trying to game other professional basketball evaluators, and to them, I would have to imagine that this trade is too ridiculous to consider real if they expect deception. Are the Celtics that convinced they can land Durant, and prefer to risk passing up value in the draft? Maybe.

Ante Zizic may prove to be a valuable pick, as he performed well in both Andrew and Kevin’s model. Pretty much everyone else, in my opinion, is forgettable. With so many picks in a draft that didn’t fall off to 0 until considerably later, it’s a little disappointing that the Celtics passed on so many players that probably would have helped them more, or passed on shipping some of those picks for one of the awesome trade packages they apparently had lying on the table.

Next: Grading the 2016 NBA mock drafts

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