Nylon Calculus Week 16 in Review: Trades and Westbrook’s variables
By Justin
Well, it’s that time: the trade deadline is close. We can all dream of our favorite teams deftly pulling off the perfect crime of a trade, bringing in that last piece to push them over the top. Sadly, due to the tight cap space around the league and the general disinterest in wanting to compete with the Warriors, we may be in for fewer trades that we’re hoping.
A handful of teams are specifically looking for upgrades, but when there are fewer options on the market, and when teams are valuing first round picks like food during a storm, it’s hard to find anything suitable. We may see a lot of settling for a small fix-type deals, like Tyler Zeller to the Bucks. And with that, let’s look at the last week of basketball.
Blake Griffin shipped from Hollywood to Detroit
In a surprising trade, the Clippers waved the white flag and traded their star, who helped them ascend from the gallows and escape the laughingstock tag the franchise had for decades, all for rebuilding pieces: Blake Griffin, Brice Johnson, and Willie Reed for Tobias Harris, Avery Bradley, Boban Marjanovic, a 2019 second round pick, and a 2018 first round pick. At first glance, you have people defending the trade by saying since Detroit is not a free agent destination — apparently there are only like five or six destinations in the entire league, and most are capped out — they needed to bring in “superstar talent” in a trade like this. But that’s nearsighted and incorrect for several reasons.
First of all, how much of a star is Blake Griffin anymore? He hasn’t been to the All-Star game since 2015, and if you want to counter that by saying that’s because he was injured, you can see my main concern. (Technically, he wasn’t at the 2015 game either due to an injury, though he was chosen.) Plus, he hasn’t been selected to an All-NBA team since 2015 either. He’s talented, and he’s valuable when he’s on the court, but his injury history is scary and he’s only getting older. He has the outward appearance of a star, the kind of one casual fans would recognize and the kind of wattage that helps you land commercials but not wins. If he’s being paid fairly and you don’t give up much that’s not a big problem; but his contract is enormous and they gave up a boatload of assets. You may see dividends this season and next, but you have to look at the bigger picture.
Sorry, but we have to talk about that contract. This is the real NBA world. He’s being paid $30 million in a contract that’ll increase over $2 million a year until his player option in 2022 — which he’ll take unless the world ends. I don’t care if you’re not a free agent destination; you can still use financial flexibility in trades. And if you worry about selling tickets, the most prudent move isn’t bringing over a gigantic contract when the deal isn’t good; that’s a strange if your primary concern is cash. Smart teams in poor markets make wise transactions and build through the draft, even outside the lottery. Instead we have a prime example of why the coach/GM model can’t succeed except in the rarest of scenarios: the Clippers finally wrestled the team away from Doc Rivers and won a major trade, while Stan Van Gundy is grasping for a way to make the team more competitive and save his job. The Griffin contract was one of Doc’s last moves as GM, and as others have noted Stan’s choice could irrevocably damage the team long after he’s gone.
As Zach Lowe noted, this is a trap for mediocrity. You make a large deal and offer your future when it’s a talent that can transform the franchise, like LeBron James. But Blake isn’t going to turn around the Pistons. Remember that the Chris Paul trade was the jump-start for the Clippers, not the presence of Griffin. We haven’t even gotten into the fit concerns. Poor Andre Drummond remade his game and is now great at the elbows, passing substantially better. But that’s Griffin’s forte too, and we don’t know how well this partnership will work. And this isn’t a rental where it’s a wait-and-see situation. Detroit has signed over their future to a player who hasn’t been an all-star in years and can’t seem to stay healthy. That’s not a smart “gamble.” It’s irresponsible.
3-pointers aren’t making Houston streaky
When people discuss Houston or other 3-point happy teams, one of the most common criticisms is that it’s a playing style prone to streakiness. Thus, the argument goes, it’s not ideal for contenders because they can fall prey to a cold streak. But as Bo Schwartz found, the Rockets have actually been one of the most stable teams on offense this season, and there’s only a small relationship between 3-point rate and offensive variability. It’s not the handicap most people think.
Dewayne Dedmon
Take note, contending teams in search of a mythical player, the stretch-5 who can still protect the rim: Dewayne Dedmon is operating in obscurity in Atlanta and he’s a cheap rental, especially compared to the haul you’d usually need to offer a player of his type. (He has a player option for 2019, but if he does well, I’d imagine he’d want to try for a better offer.) He’s an ace rebounder and an underrated rim protector with true center size. Also, he’s developed a 3-point shot, shooting 39 percent from behind the arc, and given that he’s 45 percent for his career on long-range 2-pointers, I think it’s legitimate.
Dewayne isn’t a high volume, in-your-face shooter, but if you leave him open, he can make you pay. For a center, that’s definitely good enough, and he’s great at finishing inside too — that’s an uncommon combo. He recently had a nice game against Kristraps Porzingis and the New York Knicks. He rebounded the heck out of the ball, and he defended the All-Star center well in some situations. Here’s one good contest on Porzingis’ unblockable fadeaway shot or how he darts back to contest here. And of course, he’s a good rim protector who will affect shots around the rim. He’s not the star some teams are looking for, but he’s an ideal rotation building block for a team with playoff hopes.
Jaren Jackson Senior
Jaren Jackson Jr. is one of the many lottery quality centers in the draft, and in his byline it’s mentioned he’s the son of a former NBA player. The “Jr.” in his name makes it obvious, but I don’t think many people know his father, Jaren Jackson. He’s one of the few NBA fathers who’s significantly shorter than his son, and he had a journeyman career, only fully establishing himself in a role for three years in his early 30’s. But as I found out a while ago when calculating RAPM for 1999, he’s arguably patient zero for the 3-and-D movement. To carve out a niche on the team, his job was to play aggressive defense and hit open shots, which led to Bruce Bowen and a whole generation of player types. He was a significant part of their 1999 title run with huge games to close out the Los Angeles Lakers. He’s virtually unknown now, but when his son gets picked this June in the draft, remember that there’s a story behind the father too.
Nikola Mirotic transmogrifies from Bull to Pelican
As a valuable player damaging the lottery odds of a rebuilding team who suffered the brunt of an awful practice incident, we all knew Nikola Mirotic wasn’t going to be on the Bulls for much longer. I’m just surprised he was grabbed for so little: Nikola Mirotic and a second round pick (the Pelicans’ own, not Chicago’s) for Omer Asik, Tony Allen, Jameer Nelson, options to swap second round picks in either 2020 or 2021, and a lightly protected first round pick. Most trade reactions and grades are in the C to B range because teams are holding onto their first round picks like they’re cast from solid gold and because the Bulls being worse in the near-term will be best for them long-term.
Mirotic’s contract is only through 2019, and he’s not cheap. But they took back Omer Asik’s albatross contract, and everyone’s going bananas for stretch big men. Plus, he’s not some static shooter who’s easy to guard. People respect his shot, and he’s a good slasher, able to get to the line frequently and finish. He’s good on the boards as well; many stretch big men kill you there. And did they really have to give up a second round pick? They must really have no faith in their draft evaluators — but at least it’s not their own pick, and they can swap in the future.
Here’s something to consider: the Mirotic trade is remaking the team as one with Anthony Davis as center and Mirotic as the stretch four. The injury to Cousins forced that hand, but what if they made that trade and flipped Cousins too? Suitors aren’t easy to see, but stars have definitely been moving, from Jimmy Butler to Paul George to Blake Griffin recently. They could have also gotten multiple quality starters, which is a frequent occurrence when you trade a star. I’m not saying it would have been easy — that’s probably why they weren’t shopping him aggressively. But they could have remade the team around Anthony Davis, and it’s still a roster in sore need of retooling.
A Moose rescued from Phoenix
In a rare move that benefits all parties involved, Greg Monroe was bought out by the Phoenix Suns and signed with the Boston Celtics. The Suns are playing for the lottery and probably want more playing time for their young guys before they make draft choices in June. The Celtics are doing very well but could use more help on offense — it’s not easy to find an offensive big man like Monroe. His skills make the most sense on Boston, and I even appreciate that it keeps him from going to the Pelicans and eliminating a lot of their Anthony Davis at center potential. His shooting percentages will probably drop, and I doubt he’ll be the difference maker against the Warriors or Rockets, but he’s a good backup.
And the NBA all-star team selects … Goran Dragic?
Poor LeBron James is having an awful time as a GM even when he’s doing it for fun. Kevin Love broke his hand, and to replace him for LeBron’s side Adam Silver selected Goran Dragic. NBA twitter immediately had conniption fits. By merit, it’s virtually impossible to see why he’s even a candidate; you could probably list two dozen players with better cases by individual value. It’s not often when an offensive player gets selected with a negative BPM — and even rarer when it’s not a reputation pick, like Kobe Bryant’s last selection or Carmelo Anthony in 2017. However, many people defended the pick saying Miami “deserved” one, as if we fill out the rosters with specific orders to represent the best teams. (We made that last part up but follow it blindly anyway.)
First of all, would anyone who watches a lot of Hornets and Heat games say that Miami would do worse with, for example, Kemba Walker in Dragic’s place — besides Heat fans? This isn’t even a top-three Goran Dragic season, or top-fiive — and he’s never made it before. He’s only going to the All-Star game because Miami has a surprising winning record and they were fourth in the conference. But it’s not a strong conference, and by point differential they actually look worse than the Hornets. Digging into the numbers, and looking at trends of how teams can out-perform their point differential, I have no reason to believe Miami will continue winning at this rate, besides their coaching and decent defense — and those don’t warp win percentage in close games by this much.
The Heat are not a top-heavy team that can blow-out opponents when things get close. They don’t have a history of doing anything like this, like the Grizzlies did. Make no mistake — the trend is dying and they’ve lost their last three close games. And this should be the clincher (thanks for Nate Duncan for discussing this on his podcast), opponents were shooting about 20 percent from behind the arc in clutch situations, best in the league, while Miami was shooting near 43 percent, which was also first before those three games. That’s almost entirely noise, and it’s why we’re sending Dragic to the All-Star game over more valuable, better players. (We could have also done away with the conference nonsense and selected a western guy, like Nikola Jokic.) It’s unfair and nonsensical. We can do better.
Russell Westbrook and interaction variables: Exploiting BPM
Despite declining precipitously from his MVP season, Russell Westbrook is still third in Box Plus-Minus, Basketball-Reference’s player metric, and tied for first when factoring in minutes played. That’s not just a comment on how great of a player he is, but also how it could be overvaluing Westbrook. This isn’t just me complaining or showing bias; take it from the creator of the metric. One major component of BPM is a variable that multiplies assist rate with usage rate, and Westbrook has been lapping the field with that unofficial stat. A related component is the square root of assist rate multiplied by rebound rate. With his recent growth on the defensive boards, he’s in a unique position to take advantage. But how does he rank historically in those stats, and is there anything strange going on with the overall trends?
On the page for BPM’s construction, you can see the variables I’m referring to. They’re powerful variables, and they’re included for a reason: they greatly increase the model’s prediction power. Let’s focus on the square-root term now, assists-times-rebounds. I’ll name this odd stat the “ball-boarder” after Oscar Robertson because he was originally the triple-double king who’d call rebounds ball boards for some reason and because I want to call them that and no one can stop me. Based on the available data, we can go back to 1974 — I don’t have opponent stats before that. You can see every season plotted below where the shading denotes minutes played. The pattern has been pretty consistent over the past few decades, but there have been a couple blips recently, most notably last year: Russell Westbrook. There’s been a slight increase in variation in the past years, but he’s the obvious outlier.
The spread in the score has slightly increased, due to the assist rate, but there’s a more pronounced effect in the below graph for the playmaker measure, AST%*Shot USG%. It has drastically changed over the years, and Westbrook’s 2017 season is completely separated from everyone else in NBA history. The spread and the top values actually dipped after the shot clock introduction for the 1955 season, but it’s been steadily climbing since. You had some standout seasons, like when Tiny Archibald led the league in points and assists, or one of Magic Johnson’s best seasons, but nothing prepared us for this.
One thing you can blame here is that assist rate is naturally tied to usage rate. Basketball-Reference’s assist rate is the amount of teammates’ field goals you’ve assisted on, so if you take a large proportion of shots, it’s a lot easier to assist a high proportion. There are more high usage seasons now, so that in turn creates more high assist rate seasons — and when you multiply them together, the effect is large. This makes era comparisons a lot tougher. You can say few players have had a usage rate like X and an assist rate like Y, but it’s a little misleading to include all, say, pre-1980 seasons in the sample because the game was simply different. It warps our understanding of what’s elite anymore when including multiple eras.
Top ball-boarder seasons, 1974-2018, min. 1500 MP
Player | Season | Team | Ball-boarder |
Russell Westbrook | 2017 | OKC | 31.3 |
Russell Westbrook | 2018 | OKC | 27.3 |
James Harden | 2017 | HOU | 24.9 |
Russell Westbrook | 2016 | OKC | 24.8 |
Jason Kidd | 2008 | NJN | 24.0 |
Magic Johnson | 1989 | LAL | 23.8 |
Nikola Jokic | 2017 | DEN | 23.6 |
Kevin Garnett | 2005 | MIN | 23.4 |
Jason Kidd | 2007 | NJN | 23.4 |
Magic Johnson | 1991 | LAL | 23.2 |
Russell Westbrook | 2015 | OKC | 23.2 |
Jason Kidd | 2008 | TOT | 23.0 |
LeBron James | 2017 | CLE | 22.8 |
LeBron James | 2018 | CLE | 22.8 |
Grant Hill | 1997 | DET | 22.6 |
Jason Kidd | 2005 | NJN | 22.2 |
Kevin Garnett | 2004 | MIN | 22.1 |
DeMarcus Cousins | 2017 | SAC | 22.1 |
Kevin Garnett | 2003 | MIN | 22.0 |
Joakim Noah | 2014 | CHI | 21.9 |
Top playmaker seasons, 1974-2018, min. 1500 MP
Player | Season | Team | Playmaker |
Russell Westbrook | 2017 | OKC | 2312 |
Russell Westbrook | 2015 | OKC | 1779 |
Russell Westbrook | 2018 | OKC | 1714 |
James Harden | 2017 | HOU | 1611 |
James Harden | 2018 | HOU | 1602 |
Russell Westbrook | 2016 | OKC | 1519 |
Chris Paul | 2009 | NOH | 1485 |
Dwyane Wade | 2009 | MIA | 1467 |
LeBron James | 2010 | CLE | 1417 |
Chris Paul | 2016 | LAC | 1409 |
Dwyane Wade | 2007 | MIA | 1391 |
John Wall | 2017 | WAS | 1379 |
Deron Williams | 2012 | NJN | 1364 |
Tracy McGrady | 2007 | HOU | 1351 |
Chris Paul | 2008 | NOH | 1334 |
Allen Iverson | 2005 | PHI | 1323 |
LeBron James | 2009 | CLE | 1308 |
Russell Westbrook | 2011 | OKC | 1307 |
Allen Iverson | 2006 | PHI | 1293 |
Dwyane Wade | 2010 | MIA | 1280 |
Fortunately, there are team adjustments for every player, meaning these league-wide environmental trends are smoothed over for the most part. But it’d still lead to a larger spread of BPM values in these recent seasons, and it’s tough to say if that’s an indication there’s a larger spread in talent or not. These interaction variables don’t have a direct, straightforward value. They’re most likely proxies for some subsets of skills. Thus, it’s unclear if the rise in the playmaker measure, for one, says anything about that proxy or if we’re seeing a wider range of valuable players.
Next: NBA Power Rankings -- Here comes the trade deadline
Regardless, they do seem to be significant variables for measuring value. They were unequivocally important for the BPM construction, and I’ve found them valuable too in my own work. It’s hard to ignore them. They do touch on something crucial, but more work is needed to control the outliers. Russell Westbrook is a very valuable player, and that’s true even when his shooting percentages are low. But some metrics aren’t capturing his worth accurately because he’s doing things we’ve never seen before.