First Pitch: It's time for MLB managers to rethink bullpen management

The Seattle Mariners came as close as they ever have to winning a World Series title, only to have bullpen management end their season. I wish I were kidding. George Kirby pitched extremely well in Game 7 of the ALCS against the Toronto Blue Jays, and both Julio Rodriguez and Cal Raleigh hit home runs. Everything was going Seattle's way. But needing just nine more outs to capture a pennant, and holding a 3-1 in the bottom of the seventh inning, Mariners manager Dan Wilson threw the entire fan base's hopes away.

He turned to Eduardo Bazardo, probably the third- or fourth-best reliever in his bullpen, to face George Springer, one of the best postseason performers ever, with two on and one out. I hate to say the result was predictable, but it really feels like it was.

Springer launched a three-run homer, sending the crowd at Rogers Centre into a frenzy and stunning Mariners fans across the country. That home run gave the Blue Jays a 4-3 lead; Toronto would win the game, and the AL pennant, by that same score.

It's easy to second-guess managerial decisions in hindsight, but this was a head-scratcher from the moment it went down. I mean, FOX announcer Joe Davis was out in front of it. Mariners fans on social media were out in front of it. Why go with Bazardo when one of the best relievers in all of baseball, closer Andres Munoz, was available?

“Bryan had given us such a good outing there and it was time to turn it over, we thought, to our leverage guys that are used in those situations,” Wilson said. “That’s what went into that decision."

After Wilson decided that converted starter Bryan Woo's day was done after 2.1 innings, he opted to go with what he was comfortable with. He wanted to use his leverage relievers who are used in those situations. This essentially means he did not want to use Munoz because it was the seventh inning, not the ninth inning. That is a problem.

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Dan Wilson's reluctance to adapt cost the Mariners the AL pennant

Munoz made 64 regular-season appearances this year, and 62 of them began in the ninth inning or later. All 64 of them involved him pitching in the ninth. He made seven postseason appearances, and five of them came in the ninth inning or later. Munoz was almost exclusively saved for the ninth inning or later, no matter the circumstance.

There's absolutely something to wanting to keep your guys in a defined role; I'm sure Munoz appreciated knowing he'd pitch in the ninth inning but not earlier. I also think there's something to using guys how they're used in the regular season. But shouldn't something be different in Game 7 of the ALCS? I mean, Woo, Seattle's best starter, pitched out of the bullpen. Why else would he be doing that? In the half-inning prior, Kevin Gausman, Toronto's ace, threw a scoreless inning on two days of rest. Game 7 of a series is the time for managers to show desperation and aggression, to throw the book out the window.

Wilson managed this game like it was a Monday night in July instead of a Monday night in mid-October (and the most important game in his franchise's history). He paid the price.

Dan Wilson chose to follow the wrong strategy with the Mariners season on the line

This isn't the first time we've seen a manager refrain from using his best reliever in a non-save situation in a winner-take-all game. The 2016 AL Wild Card Game — which, ironically enough, took place at Rogers Centre — is a game many are pointing to as a parallel here.

The Baltimore Orioles faced the Toronto Blue Jays and were tied 2-2 after eight innings. Since the Orioles were on the road, manager Buck Showalter wanted to save his closer, Zack Britton, for a save situation. This meant that he'd use just about anyone else at his disposal while the game remained tied.

Brad Brach pitched the ninth inning against the meat of the Jays' order. He got through it unscathed, but going to him instead of the guy who put up a 0.54 regular-season ERA was highly questionable. Things got even weirder when Darren O'Day, a reliever who had a 3.77 ERA, pitched the 10th. Thankfully, he got through that inning scoreless. In the 11th inning, though, Showalter's reluctance to use his star reliever, in the midst of one of the best seasons a reliever has ever had, finally backfired.

Brian Duensing got the first out, but then Ubaldo Jimenez, a starting pitcher who had a 5.44 ERA in 29 appearances (25 starts) in the 2016 campaign, entered the game against the heart of the Blue Jays' order. Jimenez allowed back-to-back singles to start his outing, then surrendered a walk-off three-run home run, sending the Jays to the ALDS.

In a winner-take-all game, Showalter did not use his best player for reasons that are impossible to defend. He wanted to save Britton for a situation that never came. Wilson did use Munoz, but that was after the lead had vanished. What Wilson really wanted to do was save Munoz for a spot that never arose.

The Britton debacle was obviously a lot worse, but Wilson's blunder with Munoz was right up there.

Managers must prioritize using their best reliever in the highest-leverage spots

Wilson wanted to keep Munoz in the bullpen to eventually save the game. That's what this really came down to. It wasn't about wanting Bazardo in that spot, it was wanting Munoz to close the game when it was time. Since he obviously wasn't going to be going for an eight-out save, he had to wait a little longer. The logic behind wanting your best reliever to close a game is obvious, but what if there isn't a save opportunity to be had?

That's what happened with Britton, and that's what happened here. The save opportunity the Mariners wanted to use Munoz in vanished because the lesser reliever coughed up the lead. In the process, Seattle refused to use its best reliever in as high a leverage spot as they could have.

The tying run was in scoring position with one of the greatest postseason hitters ever at the plate. Even if they had gotten Springer out, Vladimir Guerrero Jr. loomed two batters away. This was the high-leverage moment, the one that was going to decide the game. Even if there was a save situation in the ninth, the odds of it being a tougher spot than this one were zero, considering that the heart of the Jays' order likely wouldn't be involved. The game was in the balance in that moment, and the Mariners shied away from their best weapon.

What managers can learn from this is: It's imperative to use relievers in the highest-leverage spot possible. Do I care if it's the seventh inning? Nope. Do I care if it's the sixth inning? Not at all. I can understand being patient in a non-elimination game, but in a Game 7, all hands have to be on deck. They were not in Seattle's dugout.

The Blue Jays were burned by this in the ALCS as well, refusing to use their closer, Jeff Hoffman, against the heart of the Mariners' order in Game 5. That felt like a season-defining decision made by John Schneider, but Wilson bailed him out. Even the Philadelphia Phillies were burned by this, refusing to use Jhoan Duran before the ninth inning in Games 1 and 2 in the NLDS and instead letting lesser relievers cough up huge runs.

I get that using the best reliever earlier can result in the game being blown later, and obviously over a long regular season having more defined roles is useful. But I'd rather have used my best reliever in a high-leverage spot rather than saved him for a spot that'd never come up.

Hopefully, this isn't just a learning moment for Wilson, but for all managers. The term "closer" should be thrown out the window. The best reliever should be used in the ninth inning more often than not, but there are times when using the best reliever in the seventh or eighth inning is more valuable. Don't shy away from that. Using the best reliever in the highest-leverage spot will win you more games than saving that reliever for an opportunity that might or might not arrive. I promise you that.